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A MOTHER YESTERDAY, BUT NOT TODAY:
DEFICIENCIES OF THE UNIFORM
PARENTAGE ACT FOR NON-BIOLOGICAL
PARENTS IN SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS
I. INTRODUCTION
Angie and Marcie met in college and have been together for five
years.1 They live in a nice two-story brick house in a small neighborhood
in the suburbs of Cleveland, Ohio. Like many typical couples, they
dream of having a family and growing old together with their children
and grandchildren. Eventually, the couple starts a family. Although
Angie gives birth to three beautiful children, Marcie is equally a parent.
She financially supports the children and family, takes the children to
doctor’s appointments, picks them up from school, attends basketball
games and dance recitals, helps them with their homework, and tucks
them in at night. Marcie never thinks of the children as being anything
but her own. But despite Angie and Marcie raising their children
together as a family, Marcie cannot legalize her relationship with her
children because Ohio does not recognize second parent adoption.
Unfortunately, after twelve years, the couple decides to separate.
For any divorcing couple, a custody battle can be a long and draining
process, but it generally ends with each parent receiving some type of
custodial or visitation rights. However, because Marcie was in a samesex partnership not legally recognized by the state of Ohio, Marcie is not
eligible for custody or visitation rights upon the dissolution of their
partnership. Because Angie bore the three children through artificial
insemination, she is the biological and legal parent of the couple’s three
children. Consequently, Marcie has no legal rights over her children and
cannot obtain rights to control or contribute to their upbringing; nor can
she obtain a regulatory, court enforced visitation schedule. Ultimately,
Marcie loses her children because of her sexual orientation.
Marriage provides numerous benefits to heterosexual couples that
are unavailable to same-sex couples, including a presumption of parental

This hypothetical is based on In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 2011). See In the
Matter of L.K.M., LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/in-thematter-of-lkm (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (discussing this case further). During their seven
year relationship, the lesbian couple decided to have a child together through artificial
insemination. Id. Two years after the child was born, the couple ended their relationship.
Id. Despite raising and financially supporting the child since birth, the non-biological
mother was denied custody. In re Mullen, 953 N.E. 2d at 308–09. In a 4–3 decision, the
Ohio Supreme Court granted sole custody over the child to the biological parent. Id.
1
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status.2 Most states do not allow same-sex marriage, which creates
difficulty for same-sex couples wanting to be parents.3 In addition to
prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying, many states deny same-sex
couples the ability to become parents through second parent adoption.4
Second parent adoption provides the ability for another individual to
jointly adopt a child without terminating the legal parental status of the
biological parent.5 Without second parent adoptions, states often do not
See An Overview of Federal Rights and Protections Granted to Married Couples, HUM.
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/an-overview-of-federal-rightsand-protections-granted-to-married-couples (last visited Aug. 12, 2012) (providing
examples of some of the 1,138 federal benefits same-sex partners cannot receive because of
existing federal law). Same-sex marriage is an issue of both state and federal law, because,
although states may grant the right for same-sex couples to marry, the Defense of Marriage
Act (“DOMA”) is a federal law that defines marriage as only between a man and a woman
for the purpose of any federal law or regulation. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). DOMA further limits
same-sex couples by stating that “[n]o State . . . shall be required to give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other
State . . . or a right or claim arising from such relationship.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
Regardless if a state recognizes same-sex marriage, DOMA prohibits that marriage from
being recognized by the federal government, as well as by other states. Id.
3
See, e.g., In re Mullen, 302 N.E.2d at 305 (providing that Ohio statutes do not recognize
the non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship as a parent). As of January 2013, nine
states and the District of Columbia currently recognize legal marriage between same-sex
individuals: Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
York, Vermont, and Washington. Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex
Marriage Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/human-services/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx (last updated June 2012).
Maine, Maryland, and Washington were the first states to recognize same-sex marriage
through popular vote in the November 2012 election. Gay Marriage Comes to Maine: Couples
Wed When Law Takes Effect After Midnight, NBCNEWS, http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news
/2012/12/29/16225220-gay-marriage-comes-to-maine-couples-wed-when-law-takes-effect
-after-midnight?lite (Dec. 29, 2012). In addition to these states, Illinois introduced
legislation in January 2013 to legalize same-sex marriage and to expand the civil union
rights that the state already permits to same-sex couples. John O’Connor & Sara Burnett,
Quick Push for Gay Marriage in Illinois Set Back, YAHOONEWS, http://news.yahoo.com/
quick-push-gay-marriage-illinois-set-back-035718597.html (Jan. 13, 2013). See generally
Jeffrey A. Parness, Lost Paternity in the Culture of Motherhood: A Different View of Safe Haven
Laws, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 81 (2007) (explaining that, in some instances, biological mothers
may not know what is best for their children).
4
Parenting Laws:
Second Parent Adoption, HUM. RIGHTS CAMPAIGN,
http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/maps-of-state-laws-policies (last updated Jan. 18,
2011). States like Kentucky, Nebraska, and Ohio do not recognize second parent adoption.
Id. Consequently, in a same-sex union, it is difficult for the non-biological parent to obtain
legal rights over a child. Monica K. Miller, How Judges Decide Whether Social Parents Have
Parental Rights: A Five-Factor Typology, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 72, 72 (2011). For example, the lack
of legal parenting status creates a serious disadvantage when making decisions, like
serious medical decisions, for the welfare of the child. Id.
5
DENIS CLIFFORD, FREDERICK HERTZ & EMILY DOSKOW, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN
AND GAY COUPLES 84 (Emily Doskow ed., 15th ed. 2010). The process of second parent
2
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consider a non-biological parent, like Marcie, to be a legal parent,
therefore eliminating a non-biological parent’s ability to gain legal rights
over a child at the end of a same-sex relationship.6 Consequently, both
the parent and child lose legal rights they are entitled to as members of a
parent-child relationship.7
A non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship has limited
avenues available in pursuit of legal rights over the child without the
ability to adopt as a second parent.8 Jurisdictions are greatly divided in
the treatment of non-biological parents, which results in a lack of
uniformity among the states for individuals wishing to establish legal
parental status.9 In part, this division is the result of some states
recognizing the de facto parent doctrine.10 This doctrine is an equitable
remedy that allows a non-biological parent to establish legal parental
rights when the individual has acted as a parent.11 Also, because only
some states have enacted the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”), there is a
further divide among states in defining the word “parent.”12 The UPA is
an attempt to encourage states to enact uniform legislation for equal
adoption allows a non-biological parent to become a legal parent through adoption, while
the natural or first adoptive parent retains legal parental status. Id. Therefore, states
permitting second parent adoptions allow both parents in a same-sex couple to be legal
parents. Id. Eighteen states and the District of Columbia have statutes that allow for
second parent adoptions, and eight states allow a petition for a second parent adoption
despite no explicit statutory recognition. Parenting Laws: Second Parent Adoption, supra note
4.
6
See infra Part II.C (illustrating how courts differ when considering the parentage status
of a non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship who is attempting to obtain legal
rights).
7
See Miller, supra note 4, at 72, 74 (explaining the financial and legal consequences of
the failure to establish the legal parent-child relationship); see also D’Arcy L. Reinhard,
Note, Recognition of Non-Biological, Non-Adoptive Parents in Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, and
Utah: A De Facto Parent Doctrine to Protect the Best Interests of the Child, 13 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 441, 446 (2010) (discussing how research has shown that homosexual parents are able
to raise happy and healthy children and how the termination of a parent-child relationship
in such a family structure can be detrimental to the child).
8
See infra Part II.B (comparing states that have enacted the UPA with states that have
not to illustrate the various routes states have taken in defining a parent).
9
See infra Part II.B–C (discussing the various approaches jurisdictions take to grant or
deny parental rights to the non-biological parent in a same-sex partnership).
10
See infra Part II.C (illustrating the division in judicial recognition of the de facto parent
doctrine, based in part on state legislatures’ definitions of a parent in their statutes).
11
See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Trusting Mothers: A Critique of the American Law Institute’s
Treatment of De Facto Parents, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1103, 1112 (2010) (explaining the
definition of de facto parent by the American Law Institute, which requires a de facto
parent to establish three things: (1) residency; (2) a caretaking role; and (3) that the legal
parent agreed for the non-parent to become a de facto parent).
12
See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the different ways states have either extended or
limited the language of the UPA).
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treatment to children born in and out of marriage.13 Although the UPA
creates non-discriminatory means to establish parentage of children who
are born out of marriage, its definition of “parent” fails to recognize
other types of non-traditional families, including same-sex couples.14
Therefore, the UPA does not protect same-sex couples when second
parent adoption is not available.15
While the UPA is primarily used as a guide for states when enacting
parentage statutes, it is a critical starting point for how states define a
legal parent.16 As a result, this Note proposes that the language of the
UPA be revised to include same-sex couples by recognizing a de facto
parent and amending its current language in consideration of same-sex
couples.17 This Note begins by explaining the sources that states use in
legislative and judicial definitions of parentage: the UPA and the de
facto parent doctrine.18 Next, Part II of this Note discusses the state
statutes that have and have not enacted the UPA, specifically how state
legislatures define parent.19 It then explains the judicial interpretation of
those state statutes, which permit or deny legal parental status to a nonbiological parent in a same-sex relationship.20 Part III of this Note looks
at the benefits and limitations of the UPA in comparison to parental
statutes of states that have chosen not to enact the UPA.21 Finally, Part
IV of this Note recommends amending three specific provisions of the
UPA to better guide state legislatures in defining a legal parent.22
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) Prefatory Note (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 5 (Supp.
2012).
14
See infra Part II.A (discussing the current version of the UPA, which fails to recognize
same-sex relationships in defining a parent).
15
See infra Part III.A.2 (illustrating the current UPA limitations in protecting nonbiological parents in same-sex relationships).
16
See infra Part II.A (discussing how the UPA was created to be a model statute to create
uniformity among states in parenting statutes).
17
See infra Part IV (proposing amendments to the UPA that would legally recognize a de
facto parent and establish a non-biological parent’s legal rights when consenting to
artificial insemination).
18
See infra Part II.A (presenting the valuable provisions of the UPA that impact the
determination of parentage and discussing the definition of a de facto parent).
19
See infra Part II.B (discussing the various approaches legislatures have taken in
defining a parent and determining child custody within the confines of the UPA or without
the guidance of the UPA).
20
See infra Part II.C (explaining judicial decisions to extend equitable doctrines of
psychological parenting to grant custody to a non-biological parent in a same-sex
relationship under the confines of statutory language).
21
See infra Part III (comparing the advantages and disadvantages of those states that
have enacted the UPA).
22
See infra Part IV (proposing amendments to the UPA that would better guide states in
enacting statutes that are beneficial to same-sex parents and addressing potential
problems).
13
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II. BACKGROUND
The ability to establish one’s self as the legal parent over a child is
essential for both the parent and the child.23 Although not legally
binding, the UPA guides state legislatures in creating statutes to define a
legal parent.24 States also look to common law equitable doctrines when
deciding to expand the definition of a parent to include a de facto
parent.25 First, Part II.A explains the language of the UPA used by state
legislatures in creating parenting statutes.26 Part II.B discusses the
legislative enactment of the UPA, as well as statutes in states that have
chosen not to enact the UPA, illustrating the differences in the definition
of a parent.27 Finally, Part II.C explains the judicial interpretations of
statutes defining a parent when determining whether to grant nonbiological parents in same-sex relationships legal parental rights.28
23
See Miller, supra note 4, at 72–73 (explaining that providing the social parent with legal
parental status is beneficial in providing security to the family situation, such as the ability
to handle medical situations or estate issues). By being defined as a legal parent, an
individual is granted rights over her child that are otherwise unavailable, such as the
ability to obtain custody or to make medical decisions. Id. Legal parental status will
provide rights to a child as well, like the right to inherit from such parents and the right to
receive financial support from the non-biological parent. See MARK STRASSER, SAME-SEX
UNIONS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 91–92 (2011) (discussing that the failure by a court to
establish a non-biological parent as a legal parent creates a financial disadvantage, because
the non-parent is no longer required to financially support the child at the end of a
relationship).
24
See 1 DONALD T. KRAMER, The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) § 7:23, at 645–46, in
LEGISLATIVE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (2d ed. 2005) (discussing that, although the UPA is not
universally recognized because states are not mandated to enact it, many states use the
UPA as the exclusive means to establish parentage); see also Lindsy J. Rohlf, Note, The
Psychological-Parent and De Facto-Parent Doctrines: How Should the Uniform Parentage Act
Define “Parent”?, 94 IOWA L. REV. 691, 713–14 (2009) (discussing the development of the
UPA and its guiding principles on states). The following states have enacted some version
of the UPA: Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota,
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. KRAMER, supra, at 646.
25
See Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage
Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 223
(2009) (discussing a Washington court case, which used the de facto parent doctrine to
grant custody to a non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship). A de facto parent is an
equitable common law doctrine that recognizes a person as a legal parent when there is a
parent-like relationship. See Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 11 (Del. 2009) (discussing the
ALI’s definition of the de facto parent doctrine).
26
See infra Part II.A (explaining the UPA and the important provisions that implicate
issues for same-sex parents).
27
See infra Part II.B (providing examples of how states liberally or conservatively enact
parenting statutes, both within and outside the confines of the UPA).
28
See infra Part II.C (illustrating how courts rely on the language of statutes to determine
the ability of granting parenting rights to non-biological parents of same-sex couples).
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A. The Uniform Parentage Act and the Definition of a De Facto Parent
The UPA was first approved in 1973 to create uniformity among
states in the establishment of parentage.29 During this time, state statutes
often discriminated against children born out of marriage; therefore, the
UPA was created to be a model statute to define parentage without the
consideration of marital status.30 As a result of medical advances in
conception, the UPA was further amended in 2000 and 2002 to include a
definition of a parent in relation to a child who was conceived through
artificial insemination.31 Although the UPA does not exclusively define a
parent on the basis of marital status, the current UPA only recognizes the
conception of a child in heterosexual relationships, because it defines
parentage strictly in terms of a man and a woman.32
29
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) Prefatory Note (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 5–6 (Supp.
2012). During this time, many states differentiated between children born in and out of
marriage, which resulted in a significant disadvantage for children born out of marriage.
Id. Aside from the UPA, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws addresses various topics, including parentage and probate, to create model statutes
for states. Id. The Commissioners create model state laws as a way to promote uniformity
among states, finding it a necessity as the mobility between states has increased for
individuals. About the ULC, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.
aspx?title=About%20the%20ULC (last visited Aug. 12, 2012). Uniformity among state laws
in parentage is important as mobility is increasing. See STRASSER, supra note 23, at 88
(discussing the importance in uniformity for parenting laws in order to prevent
complications for parents and children in same-sex couples).
30
See 1 KAREN MOULDING, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW § 1:15, at 96 (2012)
(stating the UPA’s purpose was to eliminate laws that defined children as “illegitimate”
and therefore deprived these children of certain rights, such as inheritance rights). The
UPA was originally created after the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment required legislation to treat children born in and out of
marriage equally and refused to allow a distinction in laws based on the marital status of
parents. See Rohlf, supra note 24, at 713 (discussing the intended purpose of the UPA).
31
David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, Biological,
and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 134 (2006). The 2000
amendment revised the original UPA’s limitation of artificial insemination procedures by a
licensed physician. Id. In 2002, the UPA further changed this provision to include a
presumption of fatherhood regardless of marital status or biological link to the child. Id.
Although family structures are changing, the law has been slow to reform to the needs of
such changes, including consideration of same-sex couples. Id. at 133–34.
32
See generally Nicole L. Parness, Note, Forcing a Square into a Circle: Why Are Courts
Straining to Apply the Uniform Parentage Act to Gay Couples and Their Children?, 27
WHITTIER L. REV. 893, 907 (2006) (explaining that the UPA was not created with
homosexuals in mind, because it fails to apply to same-sex couples and does not recognize
parental relationships within these couples). The UPA does not contain the words “gay,”
“lesbian,” “homosexual,” or “domestic partnerships,” including within the UPA provision
regarding artificial insemination. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended
2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012) (providing the UPA provision that defines the
establishment of parentage in the context of artificial insemination procedures). The
language of the current UPA clearly indicates it was created to determine parentage of
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Currently, the UPA defines a “mother” (a female as a legal parent) as
a biological or adoptive relationship between a parent and a child.33 A
mother-child relationship is established only through a woman’s giving
birth or through legal adoption.34 The father-child relationship is
defined by the same traditional definitions of a parent, through biology
or an adoption, but expands the definition to include presumptions of
paternity beyond these links.35 For example, section 204 of the UPA
states that a legal father-child relationship may be established if “for the
first two years of the child’s life, [the individual claiming paternity]
resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the
child as his own.”36 Section 204 also presumes a legal father-child
relationship for a child born within a marriage.37 In both of these

children born in heterosexual relationships. Parness, supra, at 907. For example, section
201 of the UPA, Establishment of Parent-Child Relationship, explains the definition of a
mother and father relationship with a child, failing to provide the ability to establish two
women or two men as parents. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201 (amended 2002), 9B
U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2012). In addition, only a male may be established as a father by
presumption, thereby denying the ability for a second female to be established as a mother
by a similar process. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71
(Supp. 2012).
33
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2012).
34
Id. The provision defining the legal mother-child relationship states, “(a) The motherchild relationship is established between a woman and a child by: (1) the woman’s having
given birth to the child . . . ; (2) an adjudication of the woman’s maternity; [or] (3) adoption
of the child by the woman . . . .” Id.
35
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201(b) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2012). The
provision establishing a legal father-child relationship goes beyond a traditional biological
or adoptive parent because it allows for a presumption of paternity. Id.
36
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a)(5) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 24 (Supp. 2012).
37
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a)(1) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23 (Supp. 2012).
This provision of the UPA provides for a presumption of paternity in the following
circumstances:
(a) A man is presumed to be the father of a child if:
(1) he and the mother of the child are married to each other and
the child is born during the marriage;
(2) he and the mother of the child were married to each other and
the child is born within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by
death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce [, or after a
decree of separation];
....
(4) after the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child
married each other in apparent compliance with law, whether or not
the marriage is or could be declared invalid, and he voluntarily
asserted his paternity of the child, and;
(A) the assertion is in a record filed with [state agency
maintaining birth records];
(B) he agreed to and is named as the child’s father on the
child’s birth certificate; or
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provisions, a legal parental relationship is established without the male
proving his biological or adoptive link to the child.38
In addition to section 204, section 703 of the UPA provides for the
presumption of paternity in situations in which a male intends to be a
father of the child conceived through artificial reproduction.39 This
provision further allows for the establishment of a legal father-child
relationship without the presumed father donating his sperm to conceive
the child.40 Although the UPA allows a presumption of paternity, no
provision specifically addresses the issue of a de facto parent as a legal
parent.41 In addition to the UPA, legislatures and courts have used
equitable remedies, such as the de facto parent doctrine, to define a legal
parent despite the UPA failing to recognize it.42
The de facto parent doctrine is an equitable remedy used to establish
a legal parent when an individual has in essence acted like a parent, but

(C) he promised in a record to support the child as his
own . . . .
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012).
Therefore, under this provision, a male may be presumed to be a legal parent without a
biological link, as long as there is a marriage. Id. This is the only provision in which
marriage is applied to determine parentage, but it is not the sole avenue to establish
parentage. Id.; see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 21
(Supp. 2012). (defining parent without considering marital status).
38
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 24 (Supp. 2012).
39
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012).
Section 703 states, “A man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction
by a woman . . . with the intent to be the parent of her child, is a parent of the resulting
child.” Id. Therefore, the UPA establishes paternity for the intended father rather than
granting paternity to the actual sperm donor. Id.
40
Id.
41
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012);
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012) (establishing
a legal father-child relationship through a presumption rather than a biological or adoptive
tie). The UPA has not recognized de facto parentage despite recommendations. Smith v.
Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 11 (Del. 2009); see also Rohlf, supra note 24, at 705 (explaining how
scholars have recommended changing the UPA to permit third parties who have a parentlike relationship with a child to establish legal parental status). Although the Act does not
explicitly reference de facto parent, section 204 does recognize a type of parent comparable
to the definition of a de facto parent for a father-child relationship by allowing paternity to
be established when a male holds the child out as his own. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000)
§ 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012). Even though the UPA does not
recognize a de facto parent relationship, the commission creating uniform laws has
recognized such a relationship in other model statutes. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-116
(amended 2010) (recognizing equitable adoption for purposes of probate).
42
See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176 (Wash. 2005) (applying the de facto parent
doctrine as an equitable remedy where the enactment of the UPA left gaps in the definition
of a parent).
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there is no biological link to the child.43 Although courts may vary as to
the specific requirements necessary to establish de facto parental status,
the general requirements of the doctrine have been defined by the
American Law Institute as a parent who has lived with a child for a
given amount of time and has essentially acted as a parent without
having the legal obligation to do so.44 In addition to judicial recognition
of a de facto parent, some states have statutorily defined a de facto
parent as a legal parent despite the UPA’s failure to recognize the
doctrine.45 While some states statutorily or judicially recognize the de
facto parent doctrine, others do not.46 The division in states granting
legal rights to a non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship is

43
See, e.g., id. at 176 (holding that the de facto parent doctrine was available to establish
legal parental status for a third party). The court stated the following requirements to
establish de facto parental status:
(1) the natural or legal parent consented to and fostered the parent-like
relationship, (2) the petitioner and the child lived together in the same
household, (3) the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood
without expectation of financial compensation, and (4) the petitioner
has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have
established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship, parental
in nature.
Id.
44
AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(c), at 118 (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. The ALI is
comparable to that of the Commissioners who have created the UPA. ALI Overview, THE
AM. LAW INST., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.overview (last visited
Aug. 12, 2012). It is composed of lawyers, judges, and law professors who create model
statutes and make other suggestions to the status of the law. Id. The ALI’s definition of de
facto parent provides:
(c) A de facto parent is an individual other than a legal parent or a
parent by estoppel who, for a significant period of time not less than
two years,
(i) lived with the child and,
(ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation,
and with the agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child
relationship, or as a result of a complete failure or inability of any
legal parent to perform caretaking functions,
(A) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking
functions for the child, or
(B) regularly performed a share of caretaking functions
at least as great as that of the parent with whom the child
primarily lived.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra, § 2.03(1)(c), at 118.
45
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (West 2009) (enacting, within its state statutes,
the ability to establish oneself as a de facto parent and, thus, a legal parent).
46
See infra Part II.C (comparing court decisions that have recognized a de facto parent to
those states that fail to apply the doctrine to non-biological parents).
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dependent on the legislative definition of a parent and the judicial
interpretations of such statutes.47
B. Legislative Definitions of a Parent
Legislative decisions have led to states differing in the definition of a
parent.48 Only some states have enacted the UPA.49 Other states choose
to define parentage without enacting the UPA.50 Adding to the division
among states, some states have liberally defined a parent within their
statutes, whereas other states conform to traditional definitions of a
parent.51 As a result, granting legal rights to a non-biological parent in a
same-sex relationship is heavily dependent on the language of the
statute.52
1.

State Statutory Enactments of the UPA

The UPA is a model for states, and some states have chosen to enact
the UPA with its current language while other states have enacted
altered versions of the UPA.53 In states that have altered the language of
47
See infra Part II.B–C (illustrating the inconsistency among states in enactment of
parental statues and interpretation of such statutes to allow for the de facto parent
doctrine).
48
See Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 924 (Del. 2011) (reasoning that the state legislature
made the conscious decision to adopt de facto parent within its UPA). But see Jones v.
Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 817 (Utah 2007) (discussing that it is the role of the legislature to
determine the applicable laws, and Utah’s legislature has yet to recognize a de facto parent
as a legal parent, therefore, it was not up to the court to create it).
49
See supra note 24 (detailing the states that have enacted the UPA). Other jurisdictions
have not adopted the UPA in its entirety but have used its language or certain provisions of
the UPA in their statutes. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.95 (West 2011) (using
similar language as the UPA section 703 but only granting a husband legal status as a
father when consenting to the artificial insemination of the wife).
50
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2-35.5 (West 2008) (recognizing de facto parents
despite not enacting the UPA); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1 (West 2011) (failing to adopt
the UPA but allowing a third party standing to seek custody).
51
Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (West 2009) (providing a legal parent-child
relationship to be established through de facto parent, thereby not requiring a biological or
adoptive link), with LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 116(17) (2004) (defining parent by a
biological or adoptive tie).
52
See Smith, 16 A.3d at 924 (applying the de facto doctrine to a non-biological parent in a
same-sex relationship, because the legislature clearly intended the application in these
circumstances based on language of the statute); White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2009) (refusing to extend the de facto doctrine because the legislature did not
explicitly provide for the doctrine within the statute); Jones, 154 P.3d at 819 (refusing to
apply the de facto doctrine based on statutory language).
53
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (adopting the majority of the UPA but
including new provisions, including the definition of de facto parent); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 210.822 (West 2010) (enacting the UPA-like provisions, but omitting section 204(a)(5) of
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the UPA, some use expansive language to define a parent, which is
inclusive of same-sex couples.54 Other states conservatively alter the
UPA’s language to limit the rights of same-sex couples.55
Some states choose to enact the UPA and liberally modify the
definition of a parent beyond traditional definitions.56 One way states
have done this is to include gender-neutral terminology within their
provisions.57 For example, Washington is a state that has liberally
amended its version of the UPA.58 First, it uses gender-neutral language,
where the original UPA uses “man” and “woman.”59 This is illustrated
in Washington’s enactment of UPA section 703.60 In section 703 of the
original UPA, a male is legally recognized as a parent to a child
conceived by artificial insemination, despite not being the sperm donor,
so long as he consents and intends to be the parent of that child.61
Washington amended this provision to state, “A person who provides
gametes for, or consents in a signed record to assisted reproduction with
another person, with the intent to be the parent of the child born, is the
the UPA, which allows a presumption of paternity when a man holds the child out as his
own).
54
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (including de facto parent within the definition
of a parent-child relationship); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.011 et seq. (West 2005)
(including gender-neutral language and recognizing same-sex relationships).
55
See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.822 (eliminating the presumption of paternity available
in the current UPA when a man holds a child out as his own); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15204, 78B-15-703 (West 2012) (amending the presumption of paternity language of sections
204 and 703 of the UPA).
56
Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012)
(“A man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by a women . . . is a
parent of the resulting child.”), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.710 (“A person who
provides gametes for, or consents in a signed record to assisted reproduction with another
person, with the intent to be the parent of the child born, is the parent of the resulting
child.”).
57
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.011 et seq. (enacting the UPA with genderneutral provisions).
58
Id. The Washington legislature amended its version of the UPA in 2011 not only to
include gender-neutral terms, but it has also included domestic partnerships in certain
provisions in order to provide any parent the ability to seek the determination of
parentage. SCOTT J. HORENSTEIN, Scope and Purpose of Parentage Action, in 21 WASHINGTON
PRACTICE SERIES, FAMILY AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW § 45.1, at 10 (Scott Horenstein
ed., 2011).
59
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.710. For example, under the adoption of the UPA’s
artificial insemination provision, Washington’s UPA allows for parentage to be established
by “[a] person who provides gametes for, or consents . . . to assisted reproduction with
another person, with the intent to be the parent of the child born, is the parent of the
resulting child.” Id. (emphasis added). Contra UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703
(amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012) (providing that only a male may establish
parentage over a child conceived through artificial insemination by consent).
60
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.710.
61
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012).
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parent of the resulting child.”62 Accordingly, Washington’s provision of
section 703 is expansive to include a presumption of parentage to both
males and females.63
Another way states have liberally altered their enactment of the UPA
is to include language like “domestic partnerships.”64 Although the UPA
does not solely base parentage on marital status, there are provisions
that use the term “marriage” as a basis for the presumption of
paternity.65 Because same-sex couples are unable to marry in many
states, this presumption cannot apply.66 Washington further modified its
version of the UPA to include the term “domestic partnership” within
this provision.67 When the UPA does use the term marriage as a way to
establish parentage, states like Washington allow a domestic partnership

62
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.710; see Kelly M. O’Bryan, Comment, Mommy or Daddy
and Me: A Contract Solution to a Child’s Loss of the Lesbian or Transgender Nonbiological Parent,
60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1115, 1126 (2011) (explaining that, prior to amending its language, the
provisions of Washington’s enactment of the UPA could not be applied to same-sex
couples because of the gender specific terms).
63
See supra note 58 (discussing Washington’s enactment of the UPA to include both
gender-neutral terms and the words domestic partnerships in order to be inclusive of
same-sex couples establishing parentage).
64
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.051(2) (“The provisions in this chapter apply to
persons in a domestic partnership to the same extent they apply to persons in a marriage,
and apply to persons of the same sex who have children together to the same extent they
apply to persons of the opposite sex who have children together.”). The current language
of the UPA does use marriage as one method to establish a presumption of paternity of a
child-parent relationship, stating a “man is presumed to be the father of a child if . . . he
and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child is born during the
marriage . . . .” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23 (Supp.
2012). Washington has amended its UPA to state:
(1) In the context of a marriage or a domestic partnership, a person is
presumed to be the parent of a child if:
(a) The person and the mother or father of the child are married to
each other or in a domestic partnership with each other and the child is
born during the marriage or domestic partnership . . . .
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116(1).
65
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012).
Although the UPA does not require marriage as a prerequisite to establish parentage, it
does provide that marriage is one way to establish a presumption of paternity. UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a)(1) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23 (Supp. 2012).
66
See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the limited number of states that
permit same-sex couples to legally marry).
67
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.051. The old version of Washington’s UPA was an
exact version of the original UPA; therefore, the gender specific terms and the presumption
for marriage could not be applied to determine parentage for same-sex couples. See, e.g., In
re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176 (Wash. 2005) (finding that the current version of the
state’s enactment of the UPA did not allow for it to be applied to same-sex couples but did
allow for the application of the de facto parent doctrine in such circumstances).
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to establish parentage under the same conditions, therefore permitting
the presumption to apply to same-sex couples.68
Finally, states have amended the UPA by defining a de facto
parent.69 Although the current version of the UPA does not explicitly
recognize a de facto parent, some states, like Delaware, have chosen to
define a de facto parent as a legal parent within its enacted version of the
UPA.70 Section 201 of the original UPA defines how to establish a
parent-child relationship.71 Under the Delaware UPA, this provision
provides that either mother or father may be established as a de facto
parent by meeting the requirements.72 Therefore, Delaware allows a
parent-child relationship regardless of gender and biological link.73
Despite some states expanding the definition of a parent in their enacted
version of the UPA to include same-sex parents, other states have done
68
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a)(2) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23 (Supp.
2012) (allowing a male to be presumed legal father over a child in certain circumstances,
like marriage); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116 (using similar presumption
circumstances as the UPA, but changing the language to include domestic partnership;
therefore a person of either sex can be a presumed a legal parent when the child was
conceived during a domestic partnership).
69
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (West 2009) (defining de facto parent as a legal
parent within its enactment of the UPA).
70
Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24
(Supp. 2012) (failing to explicitly recognize a de facto parent as a legal parent but allowing
for presumption of paternity in certain circumstances), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8201(c) (adopting the UPA to include de facto parent within the definition of legal parent,
which is applicable to both females and males).
71
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2012). This
provision allows a mother-child relationship to be established only when a female is the
biological mother or adoptive mother. Id. As for fathers, this provision of the UPA allows
paternity to be established on the basis of a presumption set out in section 204 and section
703 of the UPA. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24
(Supp. 2012); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp.
2012). This presumption of parentage is not available for females attempting to establish a
legal parent-child relationship. Id.
72
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c). A de facto parent under the statute will be
established if the court determines that the individual:
(1) Has had the support and consent of the child’s parent or
parents who fostered the formation and establishment of a parent-like
relationship between the child and the de facto parent;
(2) Has exercised parental responsibility for the child as that term
is defined in [section] 1101 of this title; and
(3) Has acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to
have established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child
that is parental in nature.
Id.
73
See, e.g., Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 923–24, 933 (Del. 2011) (holding that Delaware’s
de facto parent statute enabling a non-biological mother to have joint custody was
constitutional).
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the opposite and used restrictive language in altering their version of the
UPA.74
Some states have chosen to conservatively enact the UPA and alter
the language to uphold traditional definitions of a parent that restrict
same-sex parents.75 To achieve this, states restrict the application of the
UPA by removing or editing the language of provisions that allow for a
presumption of paternity.76 For example, although Ohio has only
enacted portions of the UPA, it has eliminated the presumption of
paternity provisions available under the UPA.77 In enacting section 703
of the UPA, the Ohio legislature utilized “husband,” whereas the
original UPA uses “male.”78 In the original UPA, the provision allows

See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (West 2010) (instituting a requirement of marriage
that is not found in the UPA); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-703 (West 2012) (amending the
presumption of paternity language of UPA section 703 to restrict the ability for presumed
paternity only within marriage).
75
See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (using comparably similar language to the UPA’s
section 703 for artificial reproduction, but amending the provision to only allow a husband
to be a father without a biological donation, as long as he consents to his wife’s procedure).
See generally Emmalee M. Miller, Note, Are You My Mother? Missouri Denies Custodial Rights
to Same-Sex Parent, 75 MO. L. REV. 1377, 1384–85 (2010) (noting that, despite changes in the
2002 UPA, some states have enacted different versions of the UPA, including Missouri, to
impose a marital requirement under certain provisions of the UPA). In promoting the
traditional framework for family—a husband and wife—some argue that same-sex couples
should not raise children because it denies children the fundamental right of being raised
by both a mother and father. Lynn D. Wardle, The Attack on Marriage as the Union of a Man
and a Woman, 83 N.D. L. REV. 1365, 1377 (2007).
76
See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (amending the UPA provision section 703 to only
allow a presumption of paternity within artificial insemination for a husband); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3111.95 (West 2011) (amending its enactment of section 703, as Missouri has,
to only allow a presumption of paternity for husbands); see also White v. White, 293 S.W.3d
1, 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (providing that Missouri’s enactment of the UPA has eliminated
the presumption available under the original UPA when a male holds a child out as his
own). See generally Miller, supra note 75, at 1385–87 (discussing how Missouri adopted its
UPA to include marital terms, thereby placing restrictions on presumptions for paternity).
77
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.95. But see supra Part II.A (discussing the provisions of
the UPA that provide for a presumption of paternity in certain circumstances).
78
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.95. The provision states:
(A) If a married woman is the subject of a non-spousal artificial
insemination and if her husband consented to the artificial
insemination, the husband shall be treated in law and regarded as the
natural father of a child conceived as a result of the artificial
insemination, and a child so conceived shall be treated in law and
regarded as the natural child of the husband.
Id. § 3111.95(a). See, e.g., In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241, 247 (Ohio 2002) (reasoning that the
language of the statute could not be applied to same-sex couples, and therefore it
precluded the non-biological parent from fitting within the definition of parent).
74
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for a male to be a presumed the father regardless of marital status.79 By
amending the language of these provisions, Ohio and similar states have
precluded the UPA from being applied to non-married parents.80
In addition to adding marital language to the UPA, other states have
removed the provision that allows for a presumption of paternity when a
male holds the child out as his own.81 Missouri and other states have
eliminated this provision, thereby prohibiting a presumption of
parentage that is comparable to a de facto parent.82 As a result, these
states have limited the application of the UPA, because it cannot be
applied to non-martial or non-traditional families.83 Just as states
enacting the UPA have amended it to provide for a broad or narrow
definition of a parent, states choosing not to enact the UPA have
similarly differed in defining a parent.84
2.

Statutory Definitions of a Parent Without the UPA

States choosing not to enact the UPA have various statutory
approaches in defining a legal parent and child custody.85 But just like
states enacting the UPA, these states can liberally define a parent to grant
legal rights to non-biological parents.86 On the contrary, other states
79
See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text (discussing the provisions of the UPA
that allow a male to be established as a legal father because of a presumption, even when
not married to the child’s mother).
80
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.95. Like Ohio, Missouri and Utah only permit husbands
to be the presumed father of a child conceived through artificial insemination. MO. ANN.
STAT. § 210.824; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-703 (West 2012). See, e.g., White, 293 S.W.3d at
11 (explaining that Missouri’s legislature intended for presumptions to apply in the context
of marriage).
81
See supra text accompanying note 36 (discussing section 204(a)(5), which allows a male
to be the presumed father when he “held the child as his own”).
82
MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.822; UTAH CODE ANN. § 75B-15-204; see, e.g., White, 293 S.W.3d
at 10 (explaining that the legislature intentionally left out the presumption of paternity
when a father holds a child as his own).
83
See White, 293 S.W.3d at 11 (holding Missouri’s UPA could not be applicable to samesex couples); see also Miller, supra note 75, at 1385 (discussing that Missouri has made
significant changes in its enactment of the UPA to limit its application).
84
See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing how non-UPA states have defined parent in their childcustody statutes).
85
Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (2004) (granting custody only to legal parents
unless there is substantial harm to the child), with N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1 (West
2011) (allowing non-biological individuals the ability to seek custody over a child).
86
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2-35.5 (West 2008) (allowing a de facto custodian to
establish custody of a child); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1) (2006) (providing for a de
facto custodian, within a child custody statute, who has the same ability as a biological or
adoptive parent in seeking custody over a child); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1(a)
(allowing for third parties to seek custody over a child and be granted joint custody along
with a biological or adoptive parent).
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have conservatively defined a parent to restrict the legal rights of nonbiological parents.87
Some states not enacting the UPA have created statutes that
expansively define a parent by including a de facto parent as a legal
parent.88 For example, Kentucky’s legislature has defined a de facto
parent as a legal parent.89 Kentucky recognizes a de facto parent when it
is demonstrated that he or she is the primary caregiver and financial
supporter of the child for a required period of time.90 In addition, the
statute specifies that a “court shall determine custody in accordance with
the best interests of the child and equal consideration shall be given to
each parent and to any de facto custodian.”91 Consequently, a non-

See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (granting custody only to legal parents unless
there is a showing of substantial harm to the child); Whitman v. Williams, 6 So. 3d 852, 853
(La. Ct. App. 2009) (holding natural parents have “parental primacy” that gives the parent
a “paramount right to custody of a child, and may be deprived of such right only for
compelling reasons” (quoting Wilson v. Paul, 997 So. 2d 572, 574 (La. Ct. App. 2008))).
88
See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8.5(c)–(d) (providing for a de facto custodian to establish
custody of a child); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1) (providing a de facto custodian the
ability to seek custody despite no biological or adoptive link).
89
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1)(a). The statutes defines de facto custodian as:
[A] person who has been shown by clear and convincing evidence to
have been the primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a
child who has resided with the person for a period of six (6) months
or more if the child is under three (3) years of age and for a period of
one (1) year or more if the child is three (3) years of age or older or
has been placed by the Department for Community Based Services.
Id. Further, “[o]nce a court determines that a person meets the definition of de facto
custodian, the court shall give the person the same standing in custody matters that is
given to each parent . . . .” Id. § 403.270(1)(b).
90
Id. § 403.270; see, e.g., Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 573–74 (Ky. 2010)
(explaining that a de facto custodian must show that he or she was the primary caregiver
rather than simply parenting alongside another parent); Sullivan v. Tucker, 29 S.W.3d 805,
807 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing Kentucky’s de facto custodian statute and explaining it
requires “actual possession” of the child to establish the relationship). Because of such, the
statute therefore limits the applicability of de facto custodian status. See Mullins, 317
S.W.3d at 574, 579 (reasoning the non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship could not
establish de facto parental status, but was able to demonstrate that the natural mother had
made an effective waiver of parenting status to allow for joint custody over the child).
91
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2). In addition to Kentucky, Indiana also recognizes a
de facto custodian for child custody purposes. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2-35.5. It provides
that, when a child is in the care of a de facto custodian, the court will look at the nature and
extent of the relationship with the de facto custodian when considering an action for
custody against the natural parent. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8.5(c)–(d). Therefore, a court
must consider the wishes of a de facto custodian in Indiana when determining custody
versus the wishes of a natural parent. Id. But, in Indiana, the de facto parent must
overcome the presumption of the natural parent when attempting to gain custody. In re
Guardianship of L.L, 745 N.E.2d 222, 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
87
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biological parent may be a legal parent when able to establish himself or
herself as a de facto parent.92
In addition to defining a de facto parent, these non-UPA states have
enacted broad child custody statutes to allow for persons not of legal
parental status the ability to seek custody.93 North Carolina’s legislature
has taken this approach.94 North Carolina does not expressly recognize a
de facto parent, but it allows a third party, who is not a legal parent, to
seek custody.95 Further, the statute allows for two persons to be granted
custody of a child, thereby allowing a non-biological parent of a samesex relationship to obtain joint custody of the child with a biological
parent.96 Although some non-UPA states’ legislatures provide avenues
for non-biological parents seeking legal rights, other non-UPA states
have taken the contrary approach to restrict parenting rights solely to
traditional parents.97
In contrast to states like Kentucky and North Carolina, other nonUPA states’ statutes limit same-sex parents’ ability to obtain custody
because the restrictive language is only applicable to heterosexual
parents.98 For example, in Louisiana the legal relationship between a
parent and a child is only established by being the biological mother or
father or through legal adoption.99 Presumption of paternity only
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270.
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1(a) (West 2011) (allowing third parties to seek
custody over a child).
94
Id.
95
Id. The statute states, “Any parent, relative, or other person . . . claiming the right to
custody of a minor child may institute an action or proceeding for the custody of such
child . . . .” Id. In addition, any order for custody by such a person will be determined by
what “will best promote the interest and welfare of the child . . . .” Id. § 50-13.2(a). See, e.g.,
Regan v. Smith, 509 S.E.2d 452, 454 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (reasoning that parties seeking
custody have equal standing, because there is no burden of proof on third parties when
determining the best interest of the child in determining custody).
96
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.2(b). This part of the statute states that an order for
custody may “grant custody to two or more persons.” Id. See, e.g., Patterson v. Taylor, 535
S.E.2d 374, 378 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (“[North Carolina’s joint custody statute] is relatively
unrestrictive, requiring a court ordering ‘joint custody’ to focus on the best interests and
welfare of the child, but otherwise allowing the court substantial latitude in fashioning a
‘joint custody’ arrangement.”).
97
See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (2004) (granting custody to a third party only
when there is a showing of substantial harm due to the legal parents having custody).
98
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1) (West 2006) (recognizing de facto parents and,
thereby, allowing a non-biological parent of a same-sex couple to establish legal parental
status). But see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (restricting the granting of child custody to
parents unless there is a substantial harm to the child).
99
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 184, 185. Louisiana does not permit the establishment of a
legal parent outside a biological or adoptive parent. Id. The state does allow for a
presumption of paternity when the child was born within 300 days of marriage; therefore,
the husband is the presumed father. Id. art. 185. The definition of a parent within
92
93
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applies in the context of a legally recognized marriage.100 Therefore, the
definition of a legal parent is severely limited.101 In addition, Louisiana
child custody statutes are restrictive and only permit courts to award
custody to non-legal parents in circumstances where granting custody to
the legal parents creates a substantial harm to the child.102 Because of
this strict statutory language, same-sex couples have difficulty obtaining
legal rights over their child in Louisiana.103
States’ legislatures greatly differ in defining a legal parent, as well as
in the determination of custody.104 States enacting the UPA may alter its
language to include a more expansive or restrictive definition of a legal
parent.105 Similarly, non-UPA states also differ in formulating parentage
Louisiana’s statute is important because its child custody statutes define the ability to grant
custody in terms of whether one is considered a parent. Id. art. 133. The legislature has
provided that child custody be granted only between the parents. Id. art. 132. The statute
only allows the granting of custody to a non-parent in circumstances where it “would
result in substantial harm to the child.” Id. art. 133. Because the statute limits the definition
of marriage, the child custody statute is limited in application to same-sex couples. See id.
art. 185 (explaining that presumption of paternity is limited to within a marriage).
100
Id. art. 185.
101
See id. art. 184, 185 (providing legal parental rights only to married women who can
prove maternity by a preponderance of the evidence).
102
See, e.g., Jones v. Coleman, 18 So. 3d 153, 159 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (interpreting article
133 to mean “[w]hen the parent competes with a nonparent of the child, the parent’s right
to custody is superior unless the parent is unable or unfit, having forfeited parental rights”
(citing Wood v. Beard, 290 So. 2d 675 (La. 1974))). Furthermore, the Louisiana court has
interpreted the statutes to invalidate parenting agreements between a parent and a nonparent, despite authority to uphold a parenting agreement in the context of a divorce,
thereby further limiting remedies for same-sex couples. See id. at 163 (stating that the
purpose of the statute was to exclusively promote parenting agreements between legal
parents, thereby foreclosing the ability of a court to uphold a child custody agreement
between a parent and non-parent).
103
See, e.g., Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d 1140, 1444 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (holding substantial
harm was equivalent to “parental unfitness, inability to provide a home, and abandonment of
parental rights, other circumstances that would cause the child to suffer positive and
substantial harm” (quoting Merritt v. Merritt, 550 So. 2d 882, 889 (La. Ct. App. 1989))). The
court, interpreting Louisiana’s child custody statutes, held that the non-biological parent in
a same-sex relationship was unable to obtain custody, because she was not considered a
parent under the statute and could not demonstrate a substantial harm to remove the child
from the biological mother’s custody. Id. at 1145.
104
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (West 2009) (allowing for a de facto parent
within the enactment of the UPA); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (limiting a third party to
seek custody only when there is substantial harm to the child in the custody of the
biological or adoptive parents); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.824 (West 2010) (limiting the
presumption of paternity only to husbands); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1(a) (West 2011)
(providing third parties the ability to seek custody over a child).
105
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116(1) (West 2005) (taking same-sex couples into
consideration by including “domestic partnership” within its version of the UPA). But see
MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.822 (omitting the presumption of paternity when a male holds the
child as his own, found within the current language of the UPA).
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and child custody statutes.106 The granting of rights to a non-biological
parent will depend heavily on the judicial interpretation of the legislative
language.107
C. Judicial Interpretation of Parenting Statutes
Based on the language of states’ statutes that define a parent and
child custody, courts are able to extend equitable remedies like the de
facto parent doctrine to non-biological parents.108 But like the variation
among states’ legislatures, courts may or may not be willing to extend
such doctrines based on the state’s statutory language.109 This difference
among the courts varies within states enacting the UPA, as well as
within states choosing not to enact the UPA.110
1.

Judicial Interpretation Within States Enacting the UPA

Judicial application of the de facto parent doctrine is dependent on
the particular state’s statutory language.111 Courts rely on the language
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (West 2006) (recognizing a de facto parent within
the statutory definition). But see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 185 (allowing a presumption of
parentage only for a male married to the mother of a child). Because courts rely heavily on
statutes, it is the legislatures that are imperative in combating discrimination against a nonbiological parent in a same-sex couple. See Miller, supra note 4, at 75, 80 (discussing how
legislatures must be specific in their parenting laws in order to guide courts correctly in the
intent behind the laws).
107
See infra Part II.C (discussing the difference among court interpretations of statutory
language to allow for, or prohibit, non-biological parents of a same-sex relationship the
ability to have parental rights over their child).
108
See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176 (Wash. 2005) (applying the de facto
parent doctrine, because the court found it was within the legislature’s intent to recognize
such relationships, and it was within the judicial discretion of the court to apply such for an
equitable remedy).
109
See White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (failing to apply de facto
parental status, because the state’s enactment of the UPA “only allows claims for
declaration of a parent-child relationship based on a biological tie or a presumption due to
marriage or attempted marriage”); Meyer, supra note 31, at 136 (explaining how courts in
California and Washington have allowed both a biological and non-biological parent in a
same-sex relationship to be legal parents because each held the child out as her own).
110
See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 176 (applying the de facto doctrine as a common
law remedy where the state’s enactment of the UPA left a gap); see also Boseman v. Jarrell,
704 S.E.2d 494, 504–05 (N.C. 2010) (allowing a non-biological parent the ability to seek
custody over a child conceived in a same-sex relationship). But cf. White, 293 S.W.3d at 15
(reasoning that there was no support for application of the common law doctrine of a de
facto parent); Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d 1140, 1143 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (precluding the
ability of a non-biological parent to seek custody without demonstrating great substantial
harm to the child).
111
Miller, supra note 4, at 75. Some courts have difficulty in determining whether the
legislature intended to allow equitable doctrines like de facto parent or to strictly interpret
106

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 2 [2013], Art. 25

556

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

and the intent of the legislature to determine if such remedies are
available.112 Some courts refuse to apply the doctrine, because the UPA
has not explicitly recognized it as a viable definition of a legal parent.113
For example, before Delaware adopted de facto parenting within its UPA
statute, a court denied applying the doctrine to a non-biological parent in
a same-sex relationship because the General Assembly did not include or
recognize it.114 It was not until the Delaware UPA codified de facto
parenting that the Delaware courts extended the doctrine to a nonbiological parent of a same-sex relationship.115
Even when a state’s legislature does not explicitly recognize de facto
parenting within the state’s UPA, courts have allowed for a nonbiological parent in a same-sex relationship to assert custodial rights.116
statutes, thereby refusing to allow de facto parent when such doctrines are not codified. Id.
In comparison, other courts are willing to find common law remedies like de facto parent,
despite the legislature’s failure to codify it, because it fills in the gaps the legislature has
ignored. Id.
112
See Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 14 (Del. 2009) (holding that, because the legislature
did not explicitly recognize de facto parent, the court did not have the ability to use this
doctrine); see also Miller, supra note 4, at 75 (discussing a California court decision broadly
applying the presumption of paternity under the UPA to a non-biological mother in a
lesbian relationship).
113
Smith, 968 A.2d. at 15; see also White, 293 S.W.3d at 11, 13 (stating that the state’s UPA
was to be used to determine parentage and it did not include de facto parenting); Miller,
supra note 4, at 74 (discussing that a strict interpretation of the UPA often results in a court
not viewing de facto parents as legal parents).
114
Smith, 968 A.2d at 14–15. In Smith, a non-biological mother sought custody over a
child the lesbian couple raised together. Id. at 3. Smith had legally adopted the child while
the couple was together, but Gordon did not legally adopt the child. Id. After the couple
ended their eleven-year relationship, Gordon sought custody of the child because she
raised and cared for the child as her own. Id. This case took place before the Delaware
legislature had amended its UPA to include a de facto parent as a legal parent; therefore,
the court denied Gordon the ability to have custody over the child. Id. at 15.
115
Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 932 (Del. 2011). The Delaware Supreme Court held that
de facto parenting was statutorily recognized by the legislature; therefore, it must be
applied when the party meets the requirements. Id. Guest, the actual adoptive parent of
the child in the lesbian relationship, attempted to argue that the application of de facto
parent violated her due process rights because she was the sole parent. Id. at 930. The
Court distinguished the Delaware de facto parent doctrine from the visitation statute at
issue in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Troxel v. Granville. Id. at 931 (citing Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000)). In Troxel, the Supreme Court held that a state visitation
statute violated the due process rights of the natural parent, because it “effectively
permit[ted] any third party seeking visitation to subject any decision by a parent
concerning visitation of the parent’s children to state-court review.” Id. at 930 (quoting
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67). Delaware distinguished the Guest case because the issue before the
Delaware court was not whether the court infringed on the fundamental rights of a parent;
rather, the issue was whether Guest was established as a legal parent under the statutory
framework. Id. at 931 (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60).
116
See Id. at 13 n.86 (discussing how other courts have applied de facto parenting
despite the doctrine not being within a state statute). In deciding not to apply the de facto
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A Washington court applied the de facto parent doctrine because it was
“necessary ‘to fill the interstices that [the] current legislative enactment
fails to cover in a manner consistent with [the] laws and stated legislative
policy.’”117 Unlike Delaware, the Washington court used the doctrine
despite it not being legislatively recognized in its UPA enactment.118
Other courts have not explicitly applied the de facto parent doctrine
but have still interpreted the state’s UPA as permitting a non-biological
parent to seek custodial rights over a child.119 In Texas, a court held that
a non-biological parent had the ability to seek custody over a child of a
same-sex relationship.120 Although Texas has not defined a de facto
parent as a legal parent within its UPA, the court interpreted the child
custody statute as permitting a non-biological parent to seek custody,
because it allowed a person with “actual care, control, and possession of
a child” to seek custody over the child.121 As these cases demonstrate,
courts are able to extend legal rights to non-biological parents in samesex relationships based on their interpretation of legislative language

parent doctrine, the Delaware court recognized that other UPA states, like Washington,
have used de facto parent despite the failure of the legislature to recognize it. Id. at 13.
Washington had based its decision to apply de facto parent to a non-biological parent in a
lesbian relationship by determining the legislature did not preclude it. Id. at 13–14.
Regardless of this precedent, Delaware failed to follow this line of reasoning and did not
extend de facto parenting to the non-biological parent of the same-sex couple because of
the statutory language of the Delaware UPA. Id. at 15.
117
In re Parentage J.M.W., No. 64334-7-I, 2010 WL 4159385, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct.
25, 2010) (quoting In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 707 (Wash. 2005)).
118
Id.
119
See In re M.K.S.-V, 301 S.W.3d 460, 465 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that a nonbiological mother had standing to seek conservatorship over a child conceived during the
lesbian relationship through artificial insemination).
120
Id. In the case of M.K.S.-V, the couple was together for six years before deciding to
conceive a child through artificial insemination. Id. at 462. Together, they decided to
parent the child. Id. After the couple split, the birth mother and the non-biological mother
agreed to a visitation schedule. Id. They continued to adhere to the schedule for two years
until the birth mother abruptly discontinued the visits. Id. The non-biological mother then
filed suit to seek custody over the child she had parented for four years. Id. The Texas
legislature has defined conservatorship as “a person . . . who has had actual care, control,
and possession of [a] child for at least six months ending not more than 90 days preceding
the date of the filing of the petition [for conservatorship].” Id. at 464 (quoting TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9) (West 2008)). Because of this statute, the court reasoned that the
non-biological mother in a same-sex relationship has the ability to seek custody over the
child. Id. at 465.
121
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9) (providing a Texas statute outside of its
UPA enactment that allows third-party standing for custody by showing the necessary
elements of conservatorship). But cf. id. at §§ 160.001 et seq. (2011) (declaring that Texas’s
enactment of the UPA does not include the de facto parent doctrine); see also In re M.K.S.-V,
301 S.W.3d at 464 (explaining that the conservatorship statute allows individuals to have
standing to seek custody over a child).
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and intent.122 But when legislators narrowly define parenting and child
custody statutes, courts have less discretion to extend equitable doctrines
to these types of parents.123
Most often, when states restrict the language of the UPA, courts will
not recognize a de facto parent.124 In Missouri, the legislature enacted a
restrictive version of the UPA, eliminating and narrowing the
presumption of parentage provisions.125 A court determined the de facto
parent doctrine was not available because the legislature had intended to
exclude such when it narrowed the language of its UPA.126 Therefore,
the court refused to extend equitable remedies to non-biological parents
in same-sex relationships.127 The judicial ability to extend the de facto
See, e.g., Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 932 (Del. 2011) (upholding the legislature’s
enactment of de facto parent doctrine within its UPA as constitutional); In re Parentage of
L.B., 122 P.3d at 177 (holding that the de facto parent doctrine was an equitable remedy to
grant a non-biological mother in a same-sex relationship custody over the child).
123
See White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 11, 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that de facto
parenting could not be used because the legislature enacted the UPA with strict
requirements of parentage).
124
See Miller, supra note 75, at 1388–89 (discussing Missouri’s unwillingness to apply the
de facto parent doctrine to same-sex couples); see also White, 293 S.W.3d at 10 (discussing
Missouri’s enactment of the UPA that amended language from the current version of the
UPA); Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 818–19 (Utah 2007) (enacting the UPA with marital
language, and thereby the courts have rejected de facto parent because it was not within
the UPA). Non-biological parents in these states have attempted to assert in loco parentis.
See, e.g., Jones, 154 P.3d at 811–12 (discussing a non-biological parent who sought standing
to seek custody under the loco parentis doctrine, which was denied). “[I]n loco parentis is
applied when someone who is not a legal parent nevertheless assumes the role of a parent
in a child’s life” but is only able to assert visitation rights rather than custodial rights. Id. at
811. Ultimately, it is a failing argument for gay and lesbian non-biological parents, because
courts have held the end of the romantic relationship will terminate the parent-like child
relationship the biological parent gave to the non-biological parent. Id. at 815.
125
MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.822 (West 2010); see also supra note 74 (discussing Missouri’s
and Utah’s amendments of the UPA).
126
See White, 293 S.W.3d at 11 (“MoUPA only allows claims for declaration of a parentchild relationship based on a biological tie or a presumption due to marriage . . . .”); Miller,
supra note 75, at 1395 (discussing that under Missouri’s enactment of the UPA, a nonbiological mother could not establish standing to seek custody).
127
White, 293 S.W.3d at 15. In White, Leslea and Elizabeth had been together for eight
years. Id. at 6. Each woman gave birth to a child conceived through artificial reproduction,
and the two children were raised by both women. Id. After the couple separated, Leslea
petitioned the court to declare that each woman was a co-parent of the two children. Id.
However, Missouri’s UPA did not allow third parties to seek custody or visitation rights
over a child, essentially prohibiting a non-biological parent of a child conceived during a
lesbian partnership from seeking custody over the child. Id. at 11. Like Missouri, Utah
adopted a restrictive version of the UPA, including marital terms within provisions where
the UPA did not, as well as eliminating certain presumption of paternity provisions. See
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-204, 78B-15-703 (West 2012) (eliminating the presumption of
paternity when a male holds a child out as his own and restricting the artificial
insemination provision to husbands). As a result, some courts have refused to apply de
122
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parent doctrine to a non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship
depends on the state’s enactment of the UPA.128 Similarly, non-UPA
states will also differ in judicial application of the de facto parent
doctrine on the basis of statutory language.129
2.

Judicial Interpretation Within States Not Enacting the UPA

Similar to states enacting the UPA, judicial interpretation of statutes
not enacting the UPA will vary based on the expansive or restrictive
definition of a parent.130 Aside from recognizing the de facto parent
doctrine, states have granted a non-biological parent legal rights over a
child through other avenues.131 For example, North Carolina child

facto parenting because it would “exceed the proper bounds of the judiciary.” Jones, 154
P.3d at 816.
128
See In re M.K.S.-V, 301 S.W.3d 460, 465 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009) (allowing a non-biological
parent the ability to seek custody). But see White, 293 S.W.3d at 6 (prohibiting a nonbiological parent the ability to seek custody over a child conceived during her relationship).
129
See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the difference in court interpretations of non-UPA state
statutes in considering whether the court could apply psychological parenting doctrines to
a non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship).
130
See Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 505 (N.C. 2010) (holding second parent
adoption was not permitted for same-sex couples, but a non-biological parent was granted
joint custody over the child because the biological mother had lost her paramount
parenting right by consenting with the non-biological mother to co-parent the child). But
see Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d 1140, 1145 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (refusing to allow a nonbiological parent custody over a child conceived through artificial insemination during the
lesbian relationship because a natural parent’s paramount right was unable to be disturbed
absent unusual circumstances). In Boseman, the partners agreed to jointly parent a child
conceived through artificial insemination during their romantic relationship. Boseman, 704
S.E.2d at 497. The non-biological mother participated in the pregnancy and birth of their
child by various actions, including attending doctor appointments and reading to their
child in the womb. Id. The non-biological parent was an active parent throughout the
child’s life. Id. After approximately six years of raising the child together, the couple
decided to split. Id. at 498. The non-biological parent continued to provide financial
support for the child after the split. Id. The court granted joint custody to each parent. Id.
at 494. On the contrary, a Louisiana court refused to grant joint custody despite the nonbiological parent acting as a parent. Black, 12 So. 3d at 1145. A lesbian couple had a child
together using artificial insemination. Id. at 1141. At first, the biological mother permitted
weekend visits with the non-biological parent but then disallowed such visits; therefore,
the non-biological parent sought custody. Id. Ultimately, the court held that the removal
of the non-biological parent from the child’s life did not meet the substantial harm
threshold required by statute, and it subsequently denied the non-biological mother
custodial rights. Id. at 1145.
131
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (2006) (allowing an individual to be determined a de
facto custodian and given equal standing for custody of a child); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 50-13.1(a) (West 2011) (“Any parent, relative, or other person, agency, organization or
institution claiming the right to custody of a minor child may institute an action or
proceeding for the custody of such child . . . .”). A North Carolina statute allows for a court
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custody statutes allow third parties to seek custody over a child when a
parent-child like relationship has been established.132 Therefore, courts
are able to grant custodial rights to a non-biological parent.133
In some instances, courts have granted custodial rights to a nonbiological parent in a same-sex relationship when the court finds that the
natural parent has waived or relinquished his or her superior right as a
parent.134 For example, Kentucky has recognized that a non-biological
parent in a same-sex relationship had a legal right over the couple’s
child, because the biological mother waived her superior parenting right
when she brought the third party into the household and held her out to
be a parent.135 By the biological mother bringing in the third party to act
as a parent, the court reasoned that the biological mother intended to
waive her superior rights over the child, which entitled the nonbiological parent to legal rights.136 Although courts in North Carolina
and Kentucky have permitted a non-biological parent to seek custody,
this is heavily dependent on the interpretation of the respective statutory

to grant custody and visitation to third parties, as long as it is in the best interest of the
child. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.2.
132
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1(a); see also Smith v. Barbour, 571 S.E.2d 872, 877–78
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that the statute does not leave unlimited ability for any person
to establish custody over a child, but it is more narrowly applied to third parties who can
establish a parent-child like relationship).
133
See Ellison v. Ramos, 502 S.E.2d 891, 895 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (providing a nonbiological parent standing after illustrating and establishing a parent-child like
relationship); see also Boseman, 704 S.E.2d at 504–05 (reasoning that the biological mother
acted “inconsistently with her paramount parental status” by sharing parental
responsibilities with the third party, which allowed the third party (the non-biological
mother) to establish a claim for joint custody).
134
See Boseman, 704 S.E.2d at 503. Regardless of the unavailability of second parent
adoption, the court reasoned that a third party is able to assert rights to custody when the
natural parent has “acted inconsistent with her paramount parental rights.” Id. at 502.
Furthermore, the act of bringing a third party, who acts as a parent to the child, into the
family unit is evidence of a natural parent acting inconsistent with such paramount right,
which allows a third party standing for custody. Id. at 504–05.
135
Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 579 (Ky. 2010). In Mullins, the Kentucky
Supreme Court followed a similar line of reasoning as North Carolina when determining
custody of a child conceived through artificial insemination during a lesbian relationship.
Id. It reasoned a third party may establish a right to custody by showing: “(1) that the
parent is shown by clear and convincing evidence to be an unfit custodian, or (2) that the
parent has waived his or her superior right to custody by clear and convincing evidence.”
Id. at 578 (footnote omitted). Similar to North Carolina, waiver was explained to be a
parent’s “intentional surrender or relinquishment” of his or her superior right to the child
by allowing a third party acting as a parent into the home. Id. at 578.
136
Id. at 579; see also Boseman 704 S.E.2d at 503 (“[W]hen a parent brings a nonparent into
the family unit, represents that the nonparent is a parent, and voluntarily gives custody of
the child to the nonparent without creating an expectation that the relationship would be
terminated, the parent has acted inconsistently with her paramount parental status.”).
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language.137 Therefore, those states that have restrictive language are
more likely to deny such rights to a non-biological parent.138
Judicial interpretation in states not enacting the UPA may result in
the denial of parental rights to a non-biological parent in a same-sex
relationship.139 These courts deny legal rights by adhering to a
These courts
paramount parental right of biological parents.140
determine the biological parent has a paramount parental right that a
third party cannot disturb without showing a “substantial harm” to the
child.141 Courts in Louisiana have used this approach to deny a nonbiological parent of a same-sex couple legal parental rights, because
granting sole custody to the biological parent did not create a substantial
harm to the child.142 Because of these narrowed child custody statutes,
joint custody between a natural and non-biological parent is not allowed,
because it would infringe on the paramount rights of the natural
parent.143 Therefore, courts often refuse to apply any equitable remedies
the legislature has not explicitly provided.144
137
See Ellison, 502 S.E.2d at 895 (interpreting the state’s third-party custody statute as
allowing those who have established a parent-child like relationship to seek custody). But
see Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d 1140, 1143 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (limiting third-party standing
for custodial suits based on the restrictive nature of the child custody statutes).
138
See, e.g., Black, 12 So. 3d. at 1145 (denying a non-biological parent custodial rights
because such rights are given solely to biological parents unless there is substantial harm).
139
Id.
140
Id. at 1143. The court in Black stated a heightened standard is required to establish a
third party’s right to custody and is limited only to situations in which there would be
substantial harm to a child by remaining with the natural parent. Id. The non-biological
parent argued that substantial harm would occur by severing the relationship between the
third party and child. Id. at 1143–44. But the court reasoned that only in rare situations of
abuse or neglect would a third party have standing to interfere with the natural parent’s
rights. Id. at 1144.
141
Id. at 1143 (“[T]he paramount right of a parent in the care, custody, and control of his
or [her] child, the legislature has provided that an award of custody to a non-parent as
opposed to a parent can only occur in rare circumstances.”) Further, based on the language
of the statues, the court reasoned an award of custody to a non-biological parent “first
requires a finding that an award of sole custody to the parent would cause substantial
harm.” Id. Therefore, the Louisiana court refused to allow joint custody to a non-biological
parent based on this idea of paramount parental right. Id. at 1145.
142
Id. at 1145.
143
Id. The idea behind the paramount right of a natural parent has been affirmed by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville, which held “that parents have a fundamental
constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their children.” Meyer, supra note 31, at 141.
Because of such, some states have reasoned parental rights are unable to be extended to
non-biological parents. Id. But this holding in Troxel did not explicitly restrict the parental
rights of non-biological parents. Id. at 142. Rather, the decision was a narrow holding for
the given facts and left flexibility for future decisions on parental rights. Id. Those who
wish to uphold a traditional family—a mother and father—advance arguments against
gays and lesbians as parents. See generally Alysse ElHage, Why Gender Matters to Parenting:
All
Families
Are
Not
Created
Equal,
N.C.
FAM.
POL’Y
COUNCIL,
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Overall, it is clear that states have inconsistent approaches in
determining the legal parental status of a non-biological parent in a
same-sex relationship.145 The language of a state statute that defines a
parent and child custody determines whether a non-biological parent
can obtain rights over a child conceived during the same-sex
relationship.146 As a result, Part III of this Note scrutinizes the legislative
language that gives rise to the judicial interpretation to grant or deny
parenting rights in a same-sex couple.147
III. ANALYSIS
Legal recognition as a parent grants many rights and benefits to both
the parent and the child.148 Marriage is a simple way to establish legal
parental status over a child that is conceived during a marriage.149
Unfortunately, many states do not legally recognize same-sex marriage;
therefore, a non-biological parent may not be considered a legal
parent.150 In addition, because second parent adoption is not available in
many states, a non-biological parent cannot jointly adopt a child
conceived through artificial insemination or adopted during the

www.ncfamily.org/FNC/1104S1-GenderMatters.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2012) (arguing a
child suffers when they are not raised by a father and a mother). Despite these arguments,
studies have shown that homosexual parents are no different than heterosexual parents.
See 64 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Custody and Visitation of Children by Gay and Lesbian
Parents § 3 (2001) (asserting that the numerous studies comparing homosexual parents to
heterosexual parents have shown there is no difference to preclude same-sex couples from
parenting). See generally William N. Eskridge Jr., Six Myths that Confuse the Marriage
Equality Debate, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 103 (2011) (providing six myths about homosexual
marriage that are factually unfounded).
144
See Black, 12 So. 3d at 1143 (refusing to extend custody to a non-biological parent
based on the state statutes).
145
See Miller, supra note 4, at 74 (discussing the various approaches taken by courts in
determining parental status).
146
See supra note 130 (comparing the interpretation of North Carolina’s broad custody
statute, which allows non-biological parents in same-sex relationships to seek custody of a
child, with Louisiana’s restrictive statutory language, which only allows legal parental
rights to a non-biological parent in rare circumstances).
147
See infra Part III (examining the benefits and limitations in the approaches taken by
states in determining whether to grant legal parental status to same-sex couples).
148
See supra note 23 (discussing the importance of establishing a legal parent-child
relationship).
149
See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp.
2012) (permitting a presumption of paternity when a child is born within a marriage).
150
See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text (surveying the legal recognition of samesex marriage and discussing the availability of second parent adoption for same-sex
parents).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss2/25

Sroka: A Mother Yesterday, but Not Today: Deficiencies of the Uniform P

2013]

A Mother Yesterday, but Not Today

563

relationship.151 As a result, non-biological parents lose their child if the
partnership ends.152 As the UPA is an influential model for states
creating parenting statutes, it is necessary to analyze its effect on parents
and children within same-sex relationships.153
This Part analyzes the UPA in its current form.154 First, it examines
the UPA’s benefits as a whole and as it is applied to same-sex couples.155
Next, it details the numerous limitations of the UPA that result in its
inapplicability to same-sex couples, depriving them of legal parental
status.156 Further, this Note compares the UPA against the parenting
statutes of non-UPA states, illustrating how the UPA fails to protect
parents and children of same-sex couples.157 As this analysis shows, it is
necessary for state legislatures to enact effective statutes that expansively
define parentage and child custody to ensure a non-biological parent in a
same-sex relationship—who has been a parent in every other possible
way—continues to be legally recognized as a parent if the couple’s
relationship ends.158
A. The Benefits and Limitations of the UPA on Same-Sex Couples
Although the UPA is not binding on any state, it is an influential
model and one that many states have enacted in its entirety.159 Because
of the UPA’s intended purpose of protecting children born out of
marriage, the UPA has certain beneficial aspects, even for same-sex
151
See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text (explaining the definition of second parent
adoption and its availability for same-sex couples to establish legal parental status within
the United States).
152
See, e.g., In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 308–09 (Ohio 2011) (denying a non-biological
parent custody rights after the same-sex relationship ended).
153
See supra note 24 and accompanying text (explaining how the UPA is a model statue to
guide states in creating uniform laws on the definition of parentage); see also infra Part III.A
(analyzing the UPA’s application to parents within same-sex relationships).
154
See infra Part III.A (analyzing the impact of the UPA on a non-biological parent in a
same-sex relationship by showing its benefits and limitations).
155
See infra Part III.A.1 (examining the benefits of the UPA by looking at its intent and
purpose).
156
See infra Part III.A.2 (explaining that the current language of the UPA cannot be
applied to same-sex couples, thereby resulting in parents and children losing legal rights).
157
Compare infra Part III.A (scrutinizing the states that have enacted the UPA), with infra
Part III.B (examining the statutes in effect in non-UPA states to illustrate the disadvantages
of the UPA for same-sex couples).
158
See infra Part IV (contributing amendments to the language of the UPA to correct its
deficiencies in regards to non-biological parents of same-sex relationships).
159
See supra Part II.A (explaining the UPA and the provisions that are instrumental in
determining parentage); supra note 24 (discussing the states that have enacted the UPA).
Even when states enact the UPA, they may choose to alter its language. See, e.g., WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.101 et seq. (West 2005) (enacting the UPA but including genderneutral language and the term domestic partnership within marriage presumptions).
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couples.160 However, at the same time, the language of the UPA
negatively affects same-sex couples seeking legal parental status and is
overall ineffective in protecting the non-biological parent of a same-sex
couple.161
1.

Benefits of States Enacting the UPA for Same-Sex Couples

As the UPA stands, it has minimal benefits for same-sex couples,
which arise only when the intent of the UPA’s provisions are broadly
interpreted.162 One positive aspect of the UPA is that it determines
parentage without the consideration of marital status.163 Because the
intent of the UPA was to create equality among children born in and out
of marriage, states, in theory, are able to promote this intent and extend
the UPA to children of same-sex couples, despite these couples being
unable to marry.164 Even in states that do not recognize same-sex
marriage, same-sex couples would not be precluded from establishing
parenthood on the basis of the inability to marry, because the intent of
the UPA can apply despite gender-specific language, thereby benefiting
same-sex couples.165 Although some may argue that the UPA was not
enacted to extend rights to individuals in same-sex relationships, the
UPA inadvertently extends its coverage to parents in same-sex
relationships because of this intent to treat children born in and out of
marriage equally.166
See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing the benefits of the UPA).
See infra Part III.A.2 (explaining the deficiencies of the current UPA, because it fails to
recognize and protect all types of parents).
162
See supra note 64 (explaining how Washington has enacted the UPA but changed its
language, thereby allowing the provisions to apply to same-sex couples).
163
See supra note 30 and accompanying text (noting that the UPA was created in response
to the Supreme Court holding that the Fourteenth Amendment required states to treat
children born in and out of wedlock equally).
164
See MOULDING, supra note 30, at 102–03 (discussing how a California court applied the
UPA presumption of paternity provision, which grants paternity when holding a child out
as one’s own, to a non-biological mother of a same-sex relationship based on the intent of
the provision).
165
Id. Although California does not recognize same-sex marriage, it ignored the genderspecific language and used its enactment of UPA section 204(a)(4) presumption of paternity
to deny custody rights to a lesbian couple because of the intent of the provision. Id.
166
See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text (explaining that the UPA was intended
to create uniformity among children born in and outside of marriage; therefore, in applying
the UPA’s overarching purpose, marital status should not be a factor in determining legal
parental status). The UPA was created to promote equality among children who were born
in and out of wedlock. Kramer, supra note 24, at 645. The UPA intended to create a model
statute for states in order to equalize legal rights and erase discrimination that occurred
based on parental, marital status. Id. Arguably, this purpose should extend to children of
same-sex relationships in order to promote equality among children. Id.
160
161
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Moreover, the UPA provides for several instances of presumed
parentage that are beneficial to non-biological parents in a same-sex
relationship, because these provisions do not require a biological link.167
For example, the UPA recognizes a presumption of parentage that is
analogous to a de facto parent.168 Because section 204 of the UPA defines
a legal parent as one who essentially acts like a parent, courts reasonably
interpret the UPA to permit the application of equitable remedies like the
de facto parent doctrine, which further broaden the application to sameRegardless of the gender-specific language, this
sex couples.169
presumption of parental status can be extended to any non-biological
parent in a same-sex relationship, because the purpose of the provision is
to grant legal parental status when an individual acts like a parent.170
Because the UPA recognizes a presumption of parental status similar to a
de facto parent, a state can interpret this as intent to create a
presumption in a mother-child relationship for a non-biological parent in
a lesbian relationship.171 Even when courts strictly adhere to the genderspecific terms of this provision, it still protects a non-biological father in
a same-sex relationship, because he is able to establish himself as a father
by holding the child out as his own without showing a biological link.172
As a result, section 204 can protect non-biological parents when courts
look at its purpose without considering gender.173
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012);
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012). These two
provisions of the UPA allow for fatherhood to be established without proving a biological
link. Id. For example, section 204 allows a male to be a legal father if he was married to the
woman who gave birth to the child during the marriage. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000)
§ 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012). It also allows for a presumption of
paternity when a male holds a child out to the world as his own. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
(2000) § 204(a)(5) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 24 (Supp. 2012).
168
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012).
This provision provides that a male is a presumed father when “for the first two years of
the child’s life, he resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the
child as his own.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a)(5) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 24
(Supp. 2012).
169
See Miller, supra note 4, at 75 (discussing how a California court applied this UPA
provision, despite the gender terms, deeming the non-biological mother in a lesbian
relationship as a legal parent).
170
Id.
171
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a)(5) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 24 (Supp. 2012).
Although the UPA does not explicitly mention de facto parent, the presumption for
paternity is analogous to the definition of de facto parent, therefore essentially allowing a
father to be established as a de facto parent. Id.
172
Id. Because the provision does not require the presumption of paternity in the context
of a heterosexual relationship, it could be applied to a non-biological male parent
attempting to establish himself as a legal parent over a child. Id.
173
Id.
167
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Further benefiting same-sex couples, section 703 of the UPA allows a
presumption of a parent-child relationship when one partner conceives a
child through artificial insemination.174 By looking at the purpose of this
provision, courts can extend this presumption to same-sex couples who
use such procedures to conceive a child.175 The UPA allows for
parentage without a biological link because the father intended to be the
child’s parent.176 Thus, this presumption can be broadly extended to
same-sex couples in which the non-biological parent consents to the
procedures and intends to be the parent of the child.177 Even if courts
refuse to apply the provision to a female in a same-sex relationship
because of the gender-specific language of the provision, it will apply to
the non-biological father and biological father of a same-sex relationship

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012). This
provision states that “[a] man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted
reproduction by a woman as provided in Section 704 with the intent to be the parent of her
child, is a parent of the resulting child.” Id.
175
See Polikoff, supra note 25, at 222 (discussing how a court in New Jersey applied the
presumption of paternity, in a case involving artificial insemination, to a lesbian couple
despite the marital language of husband and wife).
176
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012); see also
WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 26.26.710 (West 2005) (enacting a similar provision to section 703
of the UPA but using gender-neutral terms, and, therefore, it is applicable to lesbian
couples who use artificial insemination and creates a presumption of parentage for the
non-biological parent). By extending this presumption of parentage to include same-sex
couples, a non-biological parent in a lesbian relationship is able to establish legal parentage
over a child conceived through artificial reproduction during the relationship. Id.
177
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.710 (allowing a provision similar to section
703 of the UPA to be applied to both genders, thereby enabling presumption of parentage
provisions to be applicable to same-sex couples). The provision allows for a male to be
presumed the father when he consents to assisted reproduction by a woman and intends to
parent the child. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp.
2012). The comment to the provision demonstrates that this provision “reflects the concern
for the best interests of nonmarital” children of assisted reproduction. UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT (2000) § 703 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012). Because the provision
can be applied without consideration of gender, it will apply to same-sex couples to
presume parentage for the non-biological parent. See MOULDING, supra note 30, at 102–03
(explaining how a California court broadly applied the UPA presumption provision to
grant legal parental status to a non-biological mother because of the intent); Polikoff, supra
note 25, at 222–23 (discussing the New Jersey court that applied the New Jersey
insemination statute without consideration of gender).
174
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who commission a surrogate.178 As a result, this provision of the UPA is
greatly advantageous for male parents in same-sex relationships.179
Unfortunately, the benefits of the UPA for parents in a same-sex
relationship are limited.180 In its current form, the UPA can only protect
parents of a same-sex couple if courts look solely to the intent of the
provisions and apply them without regard to gender.181 The genderspecific language of the UPA creates greater limitations than benefits to
parents in a same-sex relationship, and non-biological male fathers are
more protected than similarly situated females.182
2.

Limitations of the UPA to Same-Sex Couples

Overall, the UPA hinders same-sex couples from establishing legal
parental status.183 The UPA is inapplicable to parents of same-sex
couples for three major reasons: (1) it uses gender-specific language; (2)
it does not explicitly recognize the de facto parent doctrine; and (3) it
allows for a presumption of parentage within the context of marriage.184
First, the language of the UPA’s presumption of parentage provision is
deceptive because it only allows for a presumption of paternity, not
parentage.185 Although these provisions are applicable to a male non178
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012). The
language states that “[a] man who . . . consents to[] assisted reproduction by a
woman . . . with the intent to be the parent of her child, is a parent of the resulting child.”
Id. Arguably, if one male donates the sperm to be used by a surrogate, the male partner,
who is a non-biological parent, can be established as a father through this presumption
provision because he consents to the surrogate and intends to be the father. Id.
179
See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text (discussing the presumption of paternity
statutes available to establish a legal father relationship that are unavailable for mothers,
therefore, giving non-biological male parents in a same-sex relationship more avenues to
establish legal parental status because of their gender).
180
See infra Part III.A.2 (illustrating that the limitations of the UPA as applied to same-sex
couples are greater than the benefits).
181
Compare supra note 175 (showing how a court applied the presumption of paternity for
heterosexual couples using artificial insemination, regardless of gender; therefore, it
applied to a lesbian couple as well), with supra note 126 (discussing how a Missouri court
strictly adhered to the gender specific language of the presumption provisions and refused
to apply similar presumptions to a same-sex couple).
182
See infra Part III.A.2 (scrutinizing the language of the UPA in its current form to
demonstrate the UPA is deficient because it cannot apply to same-sex couples).
183
See supra note 32 (discussing how the UPA was not created in consideration of gay
and lesbians parents, despite the opportunity to make changes in its latest 2002
amendment).
184
See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 101 et seq. (amended 2000), 9B U.L.A. 299–376
(2001) (reading the UPA in its entirety, there is no provision explicitly recognizing the de
facto parent doctrine).
185
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012);
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012) (permitting a
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biological parent in a same-sex relationship, it limits the legal parental
status of female non-biological parents.186 When the language is strictly
enforced, it forecloses the ability of a female non-biological parent in a
same-sex relationship to assert parental status under the provisions.187
Therefore, the gender-specific language of section 703 of the UPA
unfairly makes it inapplicable to a lesbian couple who uses artificial
insemination to conceive a child.188
Furthermore, although the UPA allows for a presumption of
paternity similar to a de facto parent, this provision fails to protect samesex couples because it does not explicitly recognize a de facto parent, and
it limits this presumption solely to males.189 As a result of the UPA’s
failure to clearly provide for de facto parental status, states may refuse to
permit the doctrine, reasoning that the legislature did not provide for
such a remedy.190 Therefore, the UPA unjustly limits the application of
the de facto parent doctrine despite it providing presumptive parenting
provisions.191 When courts do allow for this presumption, its language
will only be applicable to a male non-biological parent.192 Thus, these

presumption of paternity in certain circumstances, including marriage and consent in
artificial reproduction cases).
186
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012).
Because the language specifically states that “[a] man who . . . consents to[] assisted
reproduction by a woman . . . with the intent to be the parent,” a court strictly adhering to
the language will be unable to apply this to a female non-biological parent. Id. See White v.
White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (reasoning Missouri’s UPA could not apply to
a non-biological female in a same-sex relationship because the paternity presumptions did
not apply to a female).
187
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012).
188
See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text (explaining how UPA provisions for the
presumption of paternity are applied solely to males; therefore, these UPA provisions are
not available to establish a mother-child relationship).
189
Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a)(5) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 24 (Supp.
2012) (recognizing paternity when a male holds the child out as his own, but the Act does
not explicitly define de facto parent as a legal parent), with ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 44,
§ 2.03(1)(c), at 18 (recognizing a de facto parent when the parent shows that he or she is the
primary caregiver for a period no less than two years).
190
See Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 14–15 (Del. 2009) (refusing to apply the de facto
parent doctrine because the legislature did not explicitly recognize it within its UPA
enactment); White, 293 S.W.3d at 15 (refusing to apply the de facto parent doctrine that was
used in other states like Wisconsin).
191
See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing how the UPA failed to recognize
the de facto parent doctrine recommendations); see also Smith, 968 A.2d at 14 (refusing to
recognize the de facto parent doctrine because the legislature did not recognize it in its
enactment of the UPA).
192
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp.
2012) (providing language permitting only a presumption of paternity).
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presumption provisions of the UPA unfairly discriminate against female
non-biological parents in same-sex relationships.193
Further restricting its application to same-sex relationships, the UPA
does not include terms applicable to same-sex relationships, like
domestic partnerships.194 Even a gender-neutral interpretation of section
204, which presumes paternity when a child is conceived within
marriage, cannot be applied to same-sex couples.195 Same-sex marriage
is not legalized in many states; therefore, a court cannot interpret the
provision broadly and apply it to a same-sex couple regardless of
gender.196 As a result, the UPA neglects to consider same-sex couples in
the determination of parentage, because the presumption of parentage
provisions cannot be applied to same-sex couples based on the gender
and marital requirements.197
Although the UPA was intended to equalize the status of children, it
contradicts this purpose by treating children and the non-biological
parent of a same-sex relationship differently than those in a heterosexual
relationship.198 This restricts the ability of a non-biological parent in a
same-sex relationship to establish a legal parent-child relationship,
which is necessary to ascertain custodial rights.199 In recognizing the
Id.
Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a)(1) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23 (Supp.
2012) (permitting a presumption of paternity when a child is born within a legally
recognized marriage), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116 (West 2005) (amending the
UPA with the addition of domestic partnership in UPA’s section 201(a)(1), thereby
allowing a presumption of parentage over a child conceived during a same-sex
relationship).
195
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012).
196
Id.
197
See id. (establishing a father-child relationship, regardless of a biological link, when
the male is married to the women and the child is born within that marriage).
198
See supra notes 31–32 (discussing how the Commissioners did not consider same-sex
couples in creating the UPA or its subsequent amendments). Although the UPA does not
consider same-sex couples, studies have shown that children raised in same-sex
relationships are well adjusted and just as equipped as children raised in heterosexual
households. 64 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Custody and Visitation of Children by Gay and
Lesbian Parents § 3 (2001).
199
Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp.
2012); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012)
(limiting the ability of same-sex couples to establish parentage through a presumption,
because the language of these UPA provisions only apply to heterosexual couples), with
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.116, 26.26.710 (adopting an amended version of the UPA
to include domestic partnerships and gender neutral language). Washington’s enactment
of the UPA with liberal language demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the UPA, because
Washington’s version can be applied to same-sex couples, whereas the UPA, in its current
form, is unavailable to same-sex couples. Id.; UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204 (amended
2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B
U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012).
193
194
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UPA’s limitations, some states have chosen to amend the deficiencies of
the UPA and extend its application to same-sex couples.200 But without
such state amendments, the UPA fails to grant a non-biological parent of
a same-sex couple legal parental status.201 The UPA does not fully
protect the legal rights of same-sex parents, but failing to enact the UPA
does not always result in greater access to legal rights for same-sex
couples.202
B. The Benefits and Limitations of Not Enacting the UPA for Same-Sex
Couples
Despite the inequities of the UPA, a state’s decision to create its own
parenting statutes, rather than enact the UPA, does not guarantee greater
legal rights for non-biological parents in a same-sex relationship.203
Whether a state has enacted the UPA or chosen not to, the determinative
factor in granting legal parental status to a non-biological parent is the
expansive or restrictive language of the statutes.204 Although there are
benefits to states creating their own parenting statutes, states are still
able to restrict parental status, thereby denying parents and children
legal rights they rightfully deserve.205
1.

Benefits of Not Enacting the UPA for Same-Sex Couples

The decision of a state not to enact the UPA can be beneficial for a
non-biological parent in a same-sex couple.206 The greatest benefit is that
these states are not limited by the UPA’s gender-specific and restrictive
language; therefore, states can expansively define a parent and be

200
See supra notes 57–68 and accompanying text (discussing how Washington has
amended its version of the UPA to be gender neutral, as well as include language such as
domestic partnerships, thereby allowing provisions to apply to same-sex parents).
201
Compare supra notes 57–63 (discussing Washington’s liberal enactment of the UPA to
include gender neutral language, which results in it being applicable to same-sex couples),
with supra notes 75–76 (discussing how states have enacted the UPA to include marital
terms, resulting in provisions being inapplicable to same-sex couples).
202
See infra Part III.B (analyzing the language of state parenting statutes that did not
enact the UPA and its subsequent effect on same-sex parents).
203
See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining the limitations of non-UPA parental statutes, which
hinder non-biological parents attempting to seek custody).
204
See supra Part III.A.1; infra Part III.B.1 (showing that the benefit of state statutes for
non-biological parents is dependent on whether the state expansively defines parent).
205
See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the limitations of narrow state statutes that restrict
same-sex couples from establishing themselves as legal parents).
206
See supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text (discussing how states like Kentucky
and North Carolina have enacted liberal statutes that allow third parties to seek custody
over a child).
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inclusive in the granting of custody.207 These statutes are comparably
better than the UPA, because the statutes rectify legal inequalities that
exist for non-traditional families within the UPA.208 For example, one
way states correct deficiencies in the UPA is by recognizing (or
codifying) a de facto parent as a legal parent, whereas the UPA does not
recognize the de facto parent doctrine.209 As a result, a non-biological
parent who has raised and supported a child for a given amount of years
can continue to be a parent rather than “sever[ing] a parent-child
relationship between [the child] and the person she knows to be her
mother.”210 As a result of this progressive thinking by legislatures in
codifying the de facto parent doctrine, it is better for parents in a samesex couple to be within a non-UPA jurisdiction.211
Another benefit for same-sex couples within non-UPA jurisdictions
is the embracing nature of the child custody statutes often recognized
within these states.212 Despite the fact that a state may not provide for a
de facto parent within its definition of a legal parent, states have
permitted a third party to ascertain claims for custody despite not having
a biological connection.213 By enabling a third party who has established
a parent-child-like relationship with the child to gain legal custody over
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (2006) (allowing de facto custodian status to an
individual who was not biologically linked to a child to gain legal parental status); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1(a) (West 2011) (permitting third parties to sue for custody of a
child when in the best interests of a child).
208
Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (explicitly recognizing de facto custodian), with
MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.822 (West 2010) (failing to recognize de facto parent as a result of the
UPA’s current language).
209
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270. Although Delaware has enacted the de facto parent
doctrine within its UPA, other states have not; therefore, as a whole, UPA states have not
codified the doctrine, whereas other states, such as Indiana and Kentucky, have. See supra
notes 90–91 (discussing the enactment of the de facto parent doctrine within parenting
statues).
210
See In the Matter of L.K.M., LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/
cases/in-the-matter-of-lkm (last visited Aug. 12, 2012) (discussing the consequences of a
recent Ohio decision in which the state supreme court denied a non-biological mother
parenting rights over a child, thereby severing the mother-child relationship the child had
relied upon).
211
Compare Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 503–05 (N.C. 2010) (allowing a nonbiological parent custody over a child of a same-sex relationship, because the liberal nonUPA statute allowed joint custody between a biological mother and a non-biological parent
when a parent-child like relationship was created), with White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 1
(Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (denying a non-biological parent custody over a child raised in a
lesbian relationship and refusing to apply any equitable doctrines, because the UPA did
not establish her as a legal parent).
212
See supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text (discussing states that have not enacted
the UPA and their liberal construction of child custody statutes).
213
See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text (providing North Carolina as an
example of a state that has enacted statutes allowing a third party to seek custody).
207
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the child, these states’ legislatures and courts have endorsed a de factolike parent, which will provide the non-biological parent of a same-sex
couple legal rights over the child, ensuring that the relationship is not
severed.214 Accordingly, these states are able to extend parent and child
custody statutes to a non-biological parent in same-sex couples, whereas
a narrow interpretation of the UPA cannot apply to these types of
parents.215 As a result, a non-biological parent in a same-sex couple is
able to gain legal rights over their child, ameliorating both the parent
and child.216
Another benefit of states enacting broad custodial provisions is that
the judicial decisions interpreting the statutes are also broad and
inclusive of same-sex couples.217 Therefore, even if an individual cannot
meet all required elements for a de facto parent, courts of these states
interpret the statutes to include a waiver of natural parenting rights.218
This waiver doctrine is beneficially equivalent to the de facto parent
doctrine, because courts apply it in situations when a biological parent
has intended and consented to a third party who assists in the parenting
of a child, like a de facto parent.219 Because a state codification of the de
facto parent doctrine may require the de facto parent to be the sole
caregiver, this application of waiver, as a result of broad custodial
statutes, allows non-biological parents another avenue to pursue legal

214
See, e.g., Boseman, 704 S.E.2d at 504–05 (affirming a decision for joint custody between
the biological mother and non-biological mother). North Carolina has not enacted the
UPA, but its state statute allows third parties to seek custody once a parent-child
relationship has been established. Id. This is contrary to many UPA states, which have
held that the UPA enactment within their state prohibited the use of the de facto parenting
doctrine. Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 818–19 (Utah 2007).
215
Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2012)
(limiting the ways in which an individual can be established as a parent), with supra notes
91–94 (explaining that non-UPA states have been inclusive in their statutory framework in
defining and granting custody).
216
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (2006) (providing for de facto custodian third
parties); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1(a) (West 2011) (allowing third parties to seek
custody).
217
See supra notes 133–37 (discussing judicial interpretations that have construed
custodial statutes broadly).
218
See supra notes 134–37 (discussing cases in which the court found a waiver of
paramount parenting status when a natural parent intentionally brought a third party in
the home to co-parent).
219
See id. (explaining case law that recognized a non-biological parent’s right to custody
on the rationale that the biological mother waived superior parenting rights when she
brought in a lesbian partner who was an active mother, and, as a result, the biological
mother created a psychological parent).
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rights over their child.220 Therefore, when non-UPA states expand their
definition of parent and custody in consideration of non-traditional
families, judiciaries have a greater ability to grant legal rights to parents
in same-sex relationships compared to heterosexual parents and the
restrictive language of the UPA.221
As evidenced above, states that have not enacted the UPA are
comparably better in providing legal rights to same-sex parents.222 But
because state statutes vary to a great degree, the law is convoluted
among states without the UPA, which consequently restricts the ability
of non-biological parents in same-sex relationships to establish
themselves as a legal parent.223
2.

Limitations of Not Enacting the UPA on Same-Sex Couples

In greatly limiting same-sex parents’ rights, states have narrowly
defined the word “parent” comparably similar to the UPA.224 Contrary
to the UPA’s purpose, these non-UPA states often use marriage as a
means to define parentage.225 Such states are restrictive in their
definition of a parent, even going so far as to limit it to a biological or
adoptive link.226 Because these states do not recognize a presumption of
parentage outside of marriage, their statutes prohibit a court from
extending equitable relief, such as the de facto parent doctrine, in
220
See Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 570 (Ky. 2010) (reasoning the biological
parent waived her superior right when she brought in a non-biological parent, thereby
giving the non-biological parent standing to seek custody).
221
Compare supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text (discussing states that have not
enacted the UPA but have enacted broad custodial statutes because they are not limited by
the UPA), with supra notes 33–41 (detailing the provisions of the UPA that limit the
definition of legal parents).
222
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (2006) (allowing for non-biological individuals
to seek custody); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1(a) (West 2011) (allowing third parties to
seek custody). But see, e.g., Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 818–19 (Utah 2007) (refusing to
allow a non-biological mother to gain custody because of the enactment of the UPA).
223
See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 133 (2004) (limiting non-parental custody to instances
when there is a substantial harm to the child).
224
See, e.g., supra note 102 (discussing Louisiana’s statute, which requires a legal parent to
have a biological or adoptive link).
225
See supra note 99 (explaining how Louisiana has extremely limited the ability of nonbiological parents in a same-sex relationship to seek custody because of its statutory
language). Similar to Louisiana, states enacting the UPA have also limited the language of
the UPA by including marital terms. See supra note 80 (discussing how Missouri, Ohio, and
Utah have enacted their UPA by imposing marital requirements for the presumption
provision of section 703). This is contrary to the UPA’s purpose. See supra note 30 and
accompanying text (explaining that the purpose of the UPA was to create equality among
marital and non-marital children).
226
See supra note 99 (explaining how Louisiana has narrowly defined parent and how its
custody statutes foreclose the ability for a non-biological parent to obtain custody).
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accordance with the legislatures’ will.227 As a result, non-biological
parents in same-sex relationships have remarkably limited avenues to
establish themselves as a parent in comparison to the UPA, because the
UPA allows for greater presumptions of parentage without
consideration of marital status.228 Thus, when a state statute uses
marriage as a way to define a parent, it unjustly eliminates any
possibility for a non-biological parent to obtain custody over a child.229
In addition to narrowly defining parenting statutes, these states adhere
to a traditional standard of parenting based on biology.230
As a counter argument to the granting of same-sex couples parenting
rights, some states see the biological parent as having paramount rights,
which can only be interrupted in limited and exceptional
circumstances.231 This principal is problematic because it will only grant
a non-biological parent legal rights when the biological parent creates a
substantial harm for the child; therefore, both individuals in a same-sex
couple are unable to be recognized as a legal parent.232 By adhering to
such a traditional and archaic view of parenting and family, these states
limit the ability for any third party to seek custody of a child despite
acting as a parent in every way.233 In enacting such statutes, these states
perpetuate the belief that individuals in same-sex relationships are
unable to parent.234 Further, these archaic statutes promote an idea of
227
Jones, 154 P.3d at 819 (explaining its refusal to grant de facto parental status, because
the legislature clearly did not intend for such an interpretation based on its parenting
statutes).
228
Id.
229
See supra note 78 (illustrating how marital language may foreclose the ability of a nonbiological parent in a same-sex relationship to establish parentage since the presumption
provision cannot apply to relationships that are not legalized in that state).
230
Id.
231
See supra note 99 (explaining how some states have a heightened view of superior
natural parenting rights, and, therefore, these courts are unwilling to grant non-biological
parents legal rights without a showing of substantial harm).
232
Compare supra note 135 (explaining how a court rationalized its decision when a
biological parent consented and intended for another individual to help parent, and thus
the biological parent waived superior title as a parent, and the two parents were to have
joint custody over the child), with supra note 141 (explaining how some courts may
heighten this paramount parental right to prohibit joint custody with a non-biological
parent).
233
See supra note 140 (discussing a case in which a Louisiana court denied a nonbiological parent rights to her child, because the biological mother had a superior right that
could not be interfered with without a showing of substantial harm).
234
See ElHage, supra note 143, at 2 (advancing policy arguments for the adherence to a
traditional family structure of both a mother and father). Despite arguments that children
are best raised in these “traditional” families, studies show that the modern family is not
composed of these old notions of family; in addition, homosexual parents are capable of
raising functioning children. See 64 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Custody and Visitation of
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family—a male and female married with children—that is no longer the
norm.235 As these states refuse to redefine a family, same-sex couples
will likely never have the same legal rights as a traditional family.236
By assessing the benefits and limitations of the UPA in comparison
to states that have chosen not to enact the UPA, it is clear that changes to
the current version of the UPA are necessary to protect the rights of nonbiological parents of a same-sex relationship.237 Moreover, granting legal
status to a non-biological parent protects the legal rights of a child.238
The UPA intended to protect the legal rights of children born out of
marriage, but, because of its current language, it fails to protect children
born in same-sex relationships, resulting in both the parent and child
being denied certain legal rights.239
States are divided in applying the de facto parent doctrine because
the UPA has not explicitly recognized the doctrine.240 Moreover, the
gender-specific and heterosexual language of the UPA makes it
inapplicable to same-sex couples.241 Although the UPA is not binding
and not all states have enacted it, amending the UPA in consideration of
these deficiencies to protect same-sex couples will provide future
legislatures guidance in defining parent to include parents in nontraditional families.242 Because states look to the UPA in composing their
Children by Gay and Lesbian Parents § 3 (2001) (discussing research on same-sex couples
raising children).
235
See Meyers, supra note 31, at 132 (discussing how the idea of “traditional families” has
changed and that traditional marriage is no longer a societal norm). The “traditional
family”—a married heterosexual couple raising children—has decreased from forty
percent in 1970 to less than twenty-five percent in 2000. Id.
236
See, e.g., White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 10–11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (strictly enforcing
Missouri’s enactment of the UPA and refusing to extend the presumption provisions to a
female in a same-sex relationship because of the gender-specific marital language and the
additional marital requirement for a presumption of paternity).
237
See supra Part III.A.2 (illustrating the overwhelming limitations of the UPA when
applied to same-sex couples).
238
See supra note 23 (illustrating the numerous legal rights, like inheritance, a child is
entitled to from a legal parent, as well as the overall emotional factors in separating a child
from a parent who has raised him or her).
239
See Miller, supra note 4, at 81 (explaining that the failure to establish a legal parentchild relationship results in a child being unable to benefit from Social Security and life
insurance benefits, unable to file a wrongful death lawsuit, and unable to inherit through
intestacy).
240
Compare supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text (discussing Delaware’s enactment
of the UPA to include de facto parent, despite the UPA not recognizing such), with supra
notes 124–27 and accompanying text (exploring how states enacting the UPA have refused
to recognize the de facto parent doctrine because the UPA has not explicitly recognized it).
241
See supra note 24 (asserting that the UPA is influential as a guiding source for
legislatures and courts to define parent within various statutes).
242
See id. (noting that the UPA is influential as a guiding source for legislatures and
courts to define parent within their statutes); see also Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 819
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own statutes regarding the definition of parent, amending the UPA with
these considerations in mind will enable states to better combat issues
regarding the legal parental status of a non-biological parent in a samesex relationship.243
IV. CONTRIBUTION
As has been discussed, there is no uniformity among states in the
determination of legal rights for a non-biological parent over a child
conceived in a same-sex relationship.244 Status as a legal parent triggers
many legal rights and entitlements for both parent and child.245 State
uniformity in parenting and child custody laws is essential as society is
increasingly mobile.246 Furthermore, lack of uniformity among states
essentially forces same-sex couples to reside in a state based on the
applicable parenting laws.247 Because the UPA does not protect nonbiological parents of same-sex couples, the UPA should be amended.248
The following amendments to the UPA will result in a greater
application of the UPA and correct the deficiencies of the current
version. Therefore, this Note recommends modifications to three specific
UPA provisions: section 201, section 204, and section 703.249 Amending
these sections is the first step in guiding states’ legislatures to construct
statutes that are inclusive for non-biological parents of same-sex
relationships in states already enacting the UPA, as well as in states not
enacting the UPA needing assistance in such issues.250

(Utah 2007) (refusing to apply the de facto parent doctrine because the legislature did not
include such in its enactment of the UPA).
243
See infra Part IV (commenting on the proposed amendments’ effect on parents in a
same-sex relationship).
244
See supra Part II.B, Part II.C (discussing the legislative and judicial approaches taken
by states in determining legal parental status).
245
See supra note 23 (exploring the legal rights associated with the establishment of a
legal parent-child relationship).
246
Miller, supra note 4, at 72–73 (discussing the lack of uniformity in court decisions for
custody and visitation, which results in uncertainty for non-traditional families).
247
Id. at 79 (explaining that same-sex parents may need to consider the state they reside
in or plan to move based on such laws in order to protect their families).
248
See supra Part III.A.2 (analyzing the limitations of the UPA because it is inapplicable to
parents of same-sex relationships).
249
See infra Part IV (amending sections 201, 204, and 703 of the current UPA).
250
See infra Part IV (commenting on the advantages of the amendments to the UPA
provisions).
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A. Proposed Amendment to Section 201 to Define De Facto Parent as a Legal
Parent
First, this Note proposes an amendment to section 201 of the UPA to
more adequately define the legal parent-child relationship.251 In its
current form, the provision only permits a mother-child relationship to
be established by birth or adoption, whereas it allows a legal father-child
relationship to be established by subsequent presumption provisions.252
The proposed amendment to the section reads as follows:
Section 201-Establishment of Parent-Child Relationship
(a) The mother-child relationship is established
between a woman and child by:
(1) the woman’s having given birth to the child [,
except as otherwise provided in [Article] 8];
(2) an unrebutted presumption of the parentage of the
child under section 204;
(3) an adjudication of the woman’s maternity; [or]
(4) adoption of the child by the woman [; or
(5) an adjudication confirming the woman as a
parent of a child born to a gestational mother if the
agreement was validated under [Article] 8 or is
enforceable under other law];
(6) having consented to assisted reproduction under
[Article] 7 which resulted in the birth of a child [;or
(7) a determination by the court, based on clear and
convincing evidence, that the woman is a de facto parent
of the child, as established by section 201(c).
(b) The father-child relationship is established between
a man and a child by:
(1) an unrebutted presumption of the man’s
paternity parentage of the child under section 204;
(2) an effective acknowledgment of paternity by the
man under [Article] 3, unless the acknowledgement
has been rescinded or successfully challenged;
(3) an adjudication of the man’s paternity;
(4) adoption of the child by the man; [or]
(5) the man’s having consented to assisted
reproduction by a woman under [Article] 7 which
resulted in the birth of the child [;or
251
252

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2012).
Id.
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(6) an adjudication confirming the man as a parent
of a child born to a gestational mother if the
agreement was validated under [Article] 8 or is
enforceable under other law]; or
(7) a determination by the court, based on clear and
convincing evidence, that the man is a de facto parent of
the child, as established by section 201(c).
(c) De facto parental status is established, if determined by
the court, with clear and convincing evidence, that an
individual:
(1) has had the support and consent of the child’s
biological or adoptive parent(s) who intended to foster the
formation and establishment of the parent-like
relationship between the child and the de facto parent;
(2) has exercised parental responsibility for the child as a
sole primary caregiver or as a joint caregiver in
conjunction with another legal parent;
(3) has acted in a parental role for a length of time
sufficient to have established a bonded and dependent
relationship that is parental in nature, greater than a
period of one year.
(d) Establishment of parentage based on one of the above
methods is no greater or lesser in status as a legal parent, and
all are considered as equal legal parental statuses in the eyes of
the court in determination of custody or other legal matters
regarding the child. Establishment of a de facto parent does
not terminate the legal relationship of a biological or adoptive
parent.253
Commentary
The modification to this provision corrects three deficiencies within
the current UPA. First, it expands the definition of a legal mother-child
relationship. The original UPA only permits a legal mother-child
relationship to be established through birth or legal adoption, whereas it
allows for a male to be presumed the father without a biological or
adoptive link.254 As a result, non-biological mothers in same-sex

253
The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author and
have been influenced by Delaware’s enactment of the UPA. The unitalicized portions are
modeled after the original UPA. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201(a) (amended 2002),
9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (West 2009).
254
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2012).
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relationships are at a disadvantage.255 Amending the provision to
include the presumption of parentage already available for males allows
for a female non-biological mother in a same-sex relationship to be
established as a legal parent.
Second, this amendment removes the gender-specific language of
the current UPA. Under the current UPA, section 201 defines the legal
parental relationship, referencing subsequent presumption provisions.256
The presumption provisions are only applicable to a male in a
heterosexual relationship.257 Taken as a whole, the provisions together
do not apply to same-sex relationships.258 Therefore, it is necessary to
amend this definitional provision to include gender-neutral terms in
order to modify the subsequent presumption provisions, ensuring they
are also gender-neutral. As a result, all the provisions can apply to either
gender, as well as to same-sex couples.259
Finally, and most importantly, this amendment explicitly defines a
de facto parent as a legal parent and sets the requirements necessary to
establish this legal relationship. It is crucial to define a de facto parent as
a legal parent to avoid judicial confusion in granting such an equitable
remedy.260 This addition of the de facto parent takes into consideration
limitations set by other de facto statutes, including the legal rights of the
biological or adoptive parent.261 The definition of a de facto parent
requires evidence that the biological or adoptive parent intended to
create this relationship. Therefore, the definition of a de facto parent is
limited and cannot apply to any adult individual having an influential
relationship over a child. Further considering the rights of a biological or
adoptive parent, the legal recognition of a non-biological parent as a de
facto parent will not terminate the legal rights of a natural or adoptive
255
See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text (explaining that one limitation of the
UPA is that it only allows for a presumption of paternity and does not allow a mother-child
relationship to be established through a presumption).
256
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 201 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2012).
257
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012);
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012).
258
See supra notes 192–93 (discussing the inapplicability of the UPA’s presumption
provisions to female same-sex couples).
259
See 64 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Custody and Visitation of Children by Gay and Lesbian
Parents § 3 (2001) (explaining studies have shown that same-sex parents are comparable in
parenting to heterosexual parents).
260
See Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 14–15 (Del. 2009) (refusing to apply the de facto
parent doctrine to same-sex couples because the legislature did not explicitly recognize the
doctrine); Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 818 (Utah 2007) (refusing to apply the de facto
parent doctrine because it conflicted with statutory law).
261
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (West 2009) (requiring the de facto parent to show
the relationship was established with the support and consent of the parents, thereby
limiting the amount of individuals who can claim this status).
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parent, merely allowing for a joint parental relationship.262 The
definition allows for joint custody between the non-biological parent and
the biological parent in a same-sex relationship, comparable to second
parent adoption.263
B. Proposed Amendment to Section 204 to Include a Gender–Neutral
Presumption of Parentage and Legalized Same-Sex Relationships
Next, this Note proposes an amendment to section 204 of the UPA.
In its current form, this provision provides for the presumption of
paternity in certain circumstances, including marriage to the biological
mother, regardless of whether the man is the biological or adoptive
father.264 Therefore, the recommended amendments for this provision
extend the presumption to both genders. Further, it takes into
consideration same-sex relationships in granting this presumption by
recognizing domestic partnerships and civil unions. The proposed
amendment to the section reads as follows:
Section 204-Presumption of Paternity Parentage
(a) a man an individual is presumed to be the father legal
parent of a child if:
(1) he that individual and the biological mother or
father of the child are married to each other, or in a
domestic partnership or civil union, as recognized by state
law, and the child is born during the marriage that
legal relationship;
(2) he that individual and the biological mother or
father of the child were married to each other, or in a
domestic partnership or civil union, as recognized by state
law, and the child is born within 300 days after the
marriage, domestic partnership, or civil union is
terminated by death, annulment, declaration of
invalidity, or divorce[, or after a decree of
separation];
(3) before the birth of the child, he that individual
and the mother or father of the child were married to,
See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 179 (Wash. 2005) (explaining that de facto
parental status “do[es] not infringe on the fundamental liberty interests of the other legal
parent in the family unit” because it allows for joint custodial status).
263
See supra note 5 (discussing the definition of second parent adoption, which allows for
joint parental status between biological and non-biological parents in a same-sex
relationship).
264
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012).
262
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or in a domestic partnership or civil union with, each
other in apparent compliance with law, even if the
attempted marriage, domestic partnership, or civil
union is or could be declared invalid, and the child is
born during the invalid marriage, domestic
partnership, or civil union, or within 300 days after its
termination by death, annulment, declaration of
invalidity, or divorce[, or after a decree of
separation];
(4) after the birth of the child, he that individual and
the biological mother or father of the child each
married, in a domestic partnership or civil union with,
each other in apparent compliance with the law,
whether or not the marriage, domestic partnership, or
civil union is or could be declared invalid, and the
individual voluntarily asserted parentage of the child,
and;
(A) the assertion is in a record filed with [state
agency maintaining birth records];
(B) he that individual agreed to be and is named
as the child’s father parent on the child’s birth
certificate; or
(C) he that individual promised in a record to
support the child as his or her own.
(5) for the first two years of the child’s life, he
resided in the same household with the child and
openly held out the child as his own
(b) a presumption of parentage will establish an individual as
a legal parent in the eyes of the court.265
Commentary
The current language of the UPA is gender-specific and does not
consider same-sex relationships; therefore, it only applies to males in a
heterosexual relationship.266 Amending this section to be gender–
neutral, as well as inclusive of domestic partnerships and civil unions,

265
The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author and
have been influenced by Washington’s enactment of the UPA. The unitalicized portions
are modeled after the original UPA. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (amended 2002), 9B
U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp. 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.101 et seq. (West 2005).
266
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23–24 (Supp.
2012) (permitting a presumption of paternity when the father is married to the mother of
the child).
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extends the presumption of marriage to both genders and same-sex
relationships.267 Section 204(a) has been eliminated because it is no
longer necessary with the inclusion of the de facto parent doctrine under
section 201.268 These amendments to this provision will remedy the
deficiencies of the current UPA because it allows the presumption of
parentage within a marriage to be extended to same-sex couples in a
legal union—domestic partnership or civil union.269
C. Proposed Amendment to Section 703 to Include a Gender–Neutral
Presumption of Parentage Within Artificial Reproduction
Finally, the Note proposes amendments to section 703 of the UPA,
which will correct deficiencies in the current UPA. This provision allows
a male to be a presumed legal father over a child when he consents to the
artificial reproduction of the female and intends to parent the child. 270
As it currently stands, the provision can only apply to males in a
heterosexual relationship.271 The proposed amendment to the section
reads as follows:
Section 703-Paternity Parentage of Child of Assisted Reproduction
A man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted
reproduction by a woman as provided by Section 704
with the intent to be the parent of her child, is a parent
of the resulting child.
A person who biologically provides for, or consents to, assisted
reproduction with another person, regardless of gender, with
the intent to be the parent of the child born, is the parent of the
resulting child. Such consent and intent to be the parent is
sufficient to establish legal parentage status equivalent to the
biological parent of such child in the eyes of the law.272

267
See supra Part III.A.2 (analyzing the limitations of the current UPA, which arise
because of its gender-specific language).
268
See supra note 171 (comparing the UPA’s presumption provision to the ALI’s
definition of de facto parent).
269
See supra note 3 (discussing the states that have legalized domestic partnerships and
civil unions for same-sex couples).
270
See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text (explaining the presumption of paternity
available under the current version of the UPA when a male consents and intends to be the
father of a child conceived through artificial insemination, which is not available to
establish a legally recognized mother-child relationship).
271
Id. See also supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of
the gender-specific language of section 703 of the UPA).
272
The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author and
have been influenced by Washington’s enactment of the UPA. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
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Although the UPA recognizes couples that use artificial
insemination, including situations in which a third party’s sperm is
donated, the current language of the UPA fails to consider same-sex
couples that use a similar procedure.273 Under the current language,
when a lesbian couple conceives a child through artificial insemination,
the non-biological mother will not be able to establish a presumed legal
relationship.274 By amending the language of the current UPA to include
gender-neutral language, it will be applicable to same-sex couples and
provide a presumption of maternity for non-biological parents in samesex relationships.275
V. CONCLUSION
A parent’s legal status implicates numerous legal benefits for both
the parent and child, including inheritance, medical decisions, and most
importantly custody. The number of same-sex couples starting families
through adoption or artificial reproduction is increasing.276 Same-sex
couples are severely disadvantaged in establishing parenting rights,
because the majority of states do not legally recognize same-sex marriage
or second parent adoptions. Of greater importance, the risk for a nonbiological or non-adoptive parent of losing custody over a child he or she
has raised and loved over many years is of grave consequence for both
parent and child.
The UPA is highly influential when states choose to enact statutes
regarding parentage. The UPA was intended to create equality among
children born in and out of marriage. Although it achieves this purpose
in regards to heterosexual parents, the UPA does not create equality
among parents in a same-sex relationship because of its gender specific
§ 26.26.710 (West 2005). The unitalicized portions are modeled after the original UPA.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012).
273
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2012); see
supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text (explaining that the gender-specific language
precludes a female from being a presumed parent under section 703); see also supra note 177
and accompanying text (discussing that section 703 can only be beneficial to same-sex
couples if it is applied without considering gender).
274
See supra notes 186–88 and accompanying text (illustrating the limitations of the
current UPA, because the provision will not apply in its current form with gender-specific
language to a female attempting to establish parentage).
275
Id.
276
Gary Gates, Family Formation and Raising Children Among Same-Sex Couples, WILLIAMS
INST.
(Jan.
2012),
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/census-lgbtdemographics-studies/family-formation-and-raising-children-among-same-sex-couples/.
In the 2000 Census, approximately 63,000 same-sex couples were raising children, and this
number has grown to 110,000. Id.
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language. As previously explained, states that have enacted the UPA, as
well as states that have not enacted it, greatly differ in statutory
language, thereby causing inconsistency among states in the granting of
parental rights for non-biological parents. In addition, some courts are
not willing to extend equitable remedies, like de facto parenting, because
of the narrow language of their statutes. Consequently, non-biological
parents of same-sex couples have limited options if they want to gain
legal parental status over their child.
As a result of these limitations, it is essential that the current version
of the UPA be amended to consider non-traditional families—like samesex couples. By amending the UPA, states will have better guidance in
creating their own statutes for defining a de facto parent. In addition,
amending the UPA to clearly allow same-sex couples to establish
parenting status gives states greater clarity when faced with the issue of
a non-biological parent establishing custodial rights.
Returning to the hypothetical described at the beginning of this
Note: under the current version of the UPA, Marcie is unable to
establish herself as a legal parent although she and Emma created a
family together.277 Marcie was a parent—she loved, supported, and
provided for her three children. Yet, under the current law, Marcie will
not be recognized as a parent. In many states, she will lose her children
and status as a mother merely because of her sexual orientation.
However, Marcie would be protected as a legal parent if states enact the
UPA with this Note’s proposed amendments. Thus, equality compels
the UPA to modernize its language and expand its definition of
“parent.”
Jennifer Sroka*

277
See supra Part I (presenting a hypothetical, based on a recent Ohio case, in which a
non-biological mother in a same-sex relationship was denied legal parental status over the
children raised by the couple together, and therefore she lost custody of her children).
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